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Patent Shopping 
Janet Freilich* 
Over the past decade, scholars have identified many entities who use the patent system in 
ways that differ from the traditional model of patent use—entities such as patent assertion 
entities, patent aggregators, or owners of large patent portfolios. This Article presents a model 
that explains the behavior of some of the biggest and most controversial entities in the patent 
system. This Article argues that such entities are engaged in “patent shopping” where the 
plaintiff makes a strategic choice of patent in order to obtain the best facts and substance in 
a case and thereby maximize the chance of a favorable outcome. The patent shopping model 
draws by analogy on forum shopping, where plaintiffs make a strategic choice of forum in order 
to maximize the chance of a favorable outcome. The patent shopping model stands in contrast 
to the traditional model of patent use where a patentee owns a small number of patents closely 
related to a commercialized invention, which are drafted to encompass possible attempted 
work-arounds. Under the traditional model, patent acquisition comes first, infringement 
second. This Article proposes that, for patent shoppers, the chronology is flipped: infringement 
first, patent acquisition second. Instead of drafting patents to predict infringement, patent 
shoppers are able to react to infringement by selecting a patent that fits the infringing behavior. 
This is possible because most companies are constantly infringing on many different potential 
patents, infringement which has historically not been enforced. Patent shoppers have access to 
hundreds or thousands of patents, related to many different inventions, and can identify an 
instance of infringement that is a good target for enforcement and can then acquire the patent(s) 
of their choice. For instance, patent assertion entities may evaluate large numbers of patents 
that are available for sale and then select patents that can be most profitably enforced. 
Similarly, owners of large patent portfolios can shop in their own closet by selecting the best 
patents for enforcement from a wide array of options. 
This Article presents the shopping model and then conducts a qualitative review of the 
financial statements of potential patent shoppers to provide empirical evidence that these 
entities pursue patent shopping as a business strategy. Patent shopping is a way to view some 
of the most important players in the patent system and adds a new analytic perspective to the 
broad literature on these entities. The concept of shopping for good claims is not unique to 
 
* Associate Professor, Fordham Law School. For feedback and helpful comments, I thank Yonathan 
Arbel, Clark Asay, Stephanie Bair, Dmitry Karshtedt, Yotam Kaplan, Scott Kieff, Joseph Kupferman, 
Irina Manta, Nicholson Price, and Joshua Sarnoff. This Article has also benefited greatly from feedback 
from participants at the 2017 Works-in-Progress in Intellectual Property Colloquium and workshops at 
Hofstra Law School and BYU Law School. 
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patent law; it also occurs in, for example, personal injury litigation and consumer debt suits. 
Thus, the framework proposed herein is broadly applicable to many areas of law.  
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  INTRODUCTION  
“Forum shopping” refers to a method “of choosing the most favorable 
jurisdiction or court in which a claim might be heard.”1 This Article introduces the 
concept of “patent shopping,” wherein plaintiffs make a strategic choice of patent, 
in light of knowledge about infringing behaviors, in order to obtain the best facts 
and substance in a case, and thereby maximize the chance of a favorable outcome.2 
The patent shopping model provides a description of the behavior of the largest 
and most consequential players in the patent system today, including patent 
assertion entities (PAEs) and companies with large patent portfolios. 
Patent shopping is most easily explained by contrast to the traditional model 
of patent use. The traditional model begins with an invention, which then inspires 
a patent application.3 The patent application is forward looking; it is carefully 
drafted to cover both the inventor’s creation and any work-arounds that might be 
attempted by third parties.4 If third parties later engage in some infringing activity, 
the patent owner can enforce the patent in court.5 The chronology in the traditional 
view is patent acquisition first, infringement second. As a result, patent drafters 
must predict possible infringing behavior.6 This Article proposes that, for certain 
types of patent owners, the chronology is flipped: infringement first, patent 
acquisition second. The model developed by this Article explains how these patent 
owners are able to react to infringement by selecting a patent that fits the  
infringing behavior. 
Patent shopping is a story of access and choice. The patentee in the traditional 
model (the innovator) might own one or two patents, all closely related to her 
invention.7 The innovator awaits infringement and will file suit only if an instance 
of infringement covered by their patent arises.8 Shoppers, by contrast, have access 
to hundreds or thousands of patents, related to many different inventions, and can 
acquire the patent(s) of their choice, either by purchasing a patent from another or 
by scouring a large patent portfolio that the shopper already owns.9 This gives 
shoppers an expansive array of opportunities. Shoppers can identify an instance of 
infringement that is a particularly “good” target for enforcement, perhaps because 
 
1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 770 (10th ed. 2014). Similarly, legal scholars analyze whether a 
party to a boilerplate contract was “in a position to shop around” for a better option. See, e.g., Mark  
R. Patterson, Standardization of Standard-Form Contracts: Competition and Contract Implications, 52  
WM. & MARY L. REV. 327, 331 n.5 (2010). 
2. Infra Section II.A. 
3. E.g., AMY L. LANDERS, UNDERSTANDING PATENT LAW § 1.01 (3d ed. 2018). 
4. ROBERT C. FABER, FABER ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 10:1.1[B] (6th 
ed. 2008). 
5. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). 
6. Infra Part I. 
7. Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899, 
908 (2002). 
8. Infra Section II.A. 
9. E.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 1,  
7 (2005). 
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it is widespread or because the infringers are deep-pocketed.10 Shoppers can then 
obtain a patent that scores high in the relevant metrics, including the likelihood of 
surviving a validity challenge or the breadth of behavior covered by the patent.11 
The shopping model has both descriptive and prescriptive consequences. The 
ability to select patents for enforcement transforms patents from passive snares that 
capture only infringers that stumble upon them into tools of active attack that can 
be used to pursue desirable targets.12 Further, shopping divorces patent 
enforcement from the inventive process, a link that is implicit in the traditional 
model.13 Moreover, the ability to select gives shoppers a substantial advantage over 
innovators in the context of pursuing infringers.14 This advantage has important 
consequences for policy reform. Many proposals for policy reform seek to attack 
litigants by weakening patents or reducing enforcement opportunities.15 Shopping 
theory explains that these proposals will have limited effectiveness because 
shoppers can “shop around” the policies by finding patents and enforcement 
opportunities that remain viable.16 In troubling contrast, parties that are unable to 
shop, such as small inventors, will be harmed by these policies. This Article argues 
that in order to create policy that affects shoppers, the policy must target the 
shopping process itself, or its predicates, rather than patents more generally.17 
This Article proposes the patent shopping model and also provides empirical 
substantiation for the model.18 As many shoppers are PAEs, this Article conducts 
a qualitative analysis of the financial statements of all public PAEs and finds 
copious evidence that PAEs are engaged in patent shopping.19 The empirical 
evidence supports an analytic analysis of the effects of patent shopping which argues 
both that patent shoppers have a pervasive advantage over small innovators when 
it comes to patent enforcement, and also that patent shoppers and small innovators 
interact in systematically different ways with many features of the patent system. 
Successful patent shoppers can achieve staggering results. For example, 
notorious PAE Erich Spangenberg20 realized that most of the world’s largest car 
companies had for many years been using sales software that infringed on a patent 
owned by a small company—unbeknownst to both the car companies and the 
 
10. E.g., Lauren Cohen, Umit G. Gurun & Scott Duke Kominers, Patent Trolls: Evidence from 
Targeted Firms 5 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 15-002, 2018). 
11. Infra Section II.A. 
12. Infra Section III.B. 
13. Infra Section III.C. 
14. Infra Section III.A. 
15. Infra Section III.G. 
16. Infra Section III.G. 
17. Infra Section III.G.3.c. 
18. Infra Section II.B.3. 
19. Infra Section II.B.3. 
20. David Segal, Has Patent, Will Sue: An Alert to Corporate America, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 
2013 (“His clients . . . praise him as a hero . . . Mr. Spangenberg’s opponents use less flattering terms 
to describe his work. Like shakedown artist. Or patent troll.”). 
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patent owner.21 Taking advantage of this information asymmetry, Spangenberg 
acquired the patent for approximately $70,00022 and immediately filed suit against 
twenty-one car companies.23 Twenty companies settled the lawsuit for undisclosed 
sums, and the remaining defendant, Hyundai, lost the case and was found liable for 
$34 million in damages.24 Companies with large patent portfolios can also shop for 
patents within their own portfolios to strategically attack competitors or earn 
monetary returns. In a patent dispute between IBM and Sun Microsystems, Sun 
denied infringing seven patents asserted by IBM, to which IBM famously replied 
that “we have 10,000 U.S. patents [and can] . . . find seven patents you do 
infringe . . . [unless] you want to make this easy and just pay us $20 million.”25 Given 
access to enough patents, shoppers can practically ensure victory in  
enforcement battles. 
The shopping model relies on a number of underlying features of the patent 
system, notably that patent infringement is extremely widespread and rarely 
enforced.26 Shoppers capitalize on this landscape by surveying a broad array of 
infringement and choosing the leading opportunity.27 In substance, shopping 
resembles long recognized features of criminal law: the combination of overbreadth 
and prosecutorial discretion results in selective enforcement and discrimination 
against certain groups.28 Tort law is characterized by a similar pattern, rates of 
claiming are low, and tortfeasors who end up in court are generally those with  
“deep pockets.”29 
Part I lays out the traditional theory of patent use, followed by a discussion of 
the predicate conditions required for patent shopping. Part II then lays out the 
theory of patent shopping and provides qualitative evidence from review of the SEC 
statements of all public PAEs to demonstrate that many PAEs pursue a patent 
shopping strategy. Part II further extends the model to show how patent shopping 
also describes the behavior of other types of patentees, such as defensive 
aggregators and owners of large patent portfolios. Part III analyzes patent shopping. 
It begins with an explanation of why shoppers have a substantial advantage in patent 
enforcement proceedings. It then explores how shoppers and innovators interact 
differently with various aspects of the patent system and have dissimilar effects on 
the patent system. It concludes with a discussion of policy. 
 
21. Defendant Hyundai Motor America’s Motion for Remittitur at 7, Orion IP, LLC  
v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 516 F. Supp. 2d 720 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (No. 15-CV-322). 
22. Id. 
23. Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor America, 605 F.3d 967, 971 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
24. Id. 
25. Gary Reback, Patently Absurd, FORBES ( June 24, 2002), https://www.forbes.com/asap/
2002/0624/044.html [https://perma.cc/D3B6-UE8N]. 
26. Infra Section I.C. 
27. Infra Section I.C. 
28. See, e.g., Richard Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study 
of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246, 246 (1980). 
29. See Richard Abel, The Real Tort Crisis—Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443, 447 (1987) 
(describing a “crisis of underclaiming”). 
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I. THE TRADITIONAL MODEL OF PATENT USE 
This Article proposes the shopping model of patent use, which is contrasted 
with the traditional, or ex ante, model of patent use. The traditional model can be 
summarized as a series of chronological steps: (1) the inventor obtains a patent on 
the invention; (2) third parties infringe on the patent; and (3) the inventor enforces 
the patent.30 Patents, in the traditional model, are obtained towards the beginning 
of the innovation process and are forward-looking. 
The protagonist of the traditional model is the inventor.31 The model begins 
with her toiling in her garage, developing a brilliant new invention.32 After making 
the invention, she hurries to employ a patent attorney who writes a patent to protect 
her invention. Patents can generally cover somewhat more than precisely what the 
inventor has made,33 so the patent attorney works to draft a patent that will give the 
inventor the broadest scope of protection possible.34 Generally, the drafting 
attorney will consider what paths competitors might take to work around the patent, 
 
30. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 75 
(2005) (“For many years, economists typically conceptualized patents as well-defined property 
rights . . . . Once a patent was issued . . . users of the patented technology respected that right or were 
forced by courts to do so.”). The prevalence of the traditional model of patent law can be seen in the 
organization of patent textbooks. For example, Patent Law in a Nutshell begins with several chapters 
on how patents are filed and granted by the PTO, followed by a chapter on infringement, followed by 
a chapter on remedies. MARTIN J. ADELMAN, RANDALL R. RADER & GORDON P. KLANCNIK, 
PATENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL, at V–XV (2008); see also JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW, at ix (5th 
ed. 2013) (beginning with chapters on issues of patent prosecution, followed by a chapter on patent 
infringement and then a chapter on remedies for patent infringement). 
31. See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Individual Inventor Motif in the Age of the Patent Troll, 12 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 52, 54–55 (2009). 
32. Id. at 54. 
33. See, e.g., In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (“To restrict [the patentee] to  
the . . . form disclosed . . . would be a poor way to stimulate invention, and particularly to encourage its 
early disclosure.”); see also Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 848 (1990). 
34. See, e.g., CARL W. BATTLE, THE POCKET LEGAL COMPANION TO PATENTS 148 (2013) 
(“The broadest claim should describe a generalized version of the invention.”); U.S. INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 161 (Hugh Hansen ed., 2006) (“As those schooled in the patent law will 
recognize, U.S. claims drafters typically craft a . . . patent [that] is very broad and abstract.”); 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN ACADEMIA: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS 
133–34 (Nadya Reingand ed., 2012); see also Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (noting “the 
highly developed art of drafting patent claims so that they disclose as little useful information as 
possible—while broadening the scope of the claim as widely as possible”). 
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or how later iterations of the technology might develop, in order to draft a patent 
that covers these spaces.35 In short, drafting a patent is an exercise in prediction. 
Once a patent is granted, it can be enforced. If a third party infringes on the 
inventor’s patent by making, using, or selling her invention,36 she may sue the third 
party37 and obtain, depending on the circumstances, an injunction or damages.38 
The traditional model of patent use also allows for acquisition of patents. In the 
traditional model, a company would purchase a patent if the business is operating 
in a particular area and wants to develop products covered by the patent.39 Thus, 
the patent is purchased for purposes of commercialization, not enforcement. 
Enforcement of the patent occurs only if an infringer happens to venture into the 
area covered by the patent. Thus, the chronological order of patent acquisition and 
infringement remain the same: acquisition first, followed by infringement. 
The traditional model of patent use closely links patent enforcement to 
innovation. Patents are described as intended to protect innovators by providing a 
defense against a competitor stealing an innovative product or process; importantly, 
patents are not often described as an asset that can be monetized by the innovator.40 
The traditional model permeates patent theory. Its characteristics, particularly 
the forward-looking, predictive nature of the model, are most easily seen in the 
classic (and aptly named) “prospect theory.”41 Prospect theory argues that broad 
patents are socially beneficial because they enable the patent holder to control the 
future development of the technological area.42 Prospect theory relies on the 
assumption that patentees obtain patents in order to cover downstream innovation 
they believe will occur, and so that they can control this downstream innovation.43 
 
35. See, e.g., RONALD D. SLUSKY, INVENTION ANALYSIS AND CLAIMING: A PATENT 
LAWYER’S GUIDE 29–31 (2007); ASH TANKHA, PATENT YOUR IDEA 50 (2012). 
36. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
37. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012). 
38. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283–284 (2012). 
39. E.g., Kuen-Hung Tsai & Jiann-Chyuan Wang, External Technology Acquisition and Firm 
Performance: A Longitudinal Study, 23 J. BUS. VENTURING 91, 94 (2008). 
40. E.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR 
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT 18 (2007). 
41. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 
(1977). The “reward function” cited by Kitch as a contrast to prospect theory is an older descriptive 
theory of patent law which posits that patents are both ex ante incentives to innovate and rewards for 
disclosing the fruits of the innovation to the public. See John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of 
Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 439 (2004). There is a natural law element to reward theory rationalizing 
that the inventor has a “right to receive a reward for providing an invention to society, and that reward 
should be in the form of a monopoly and commensurate with the usefulness to society of the proffered 
invention.” A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents—The Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 274 (1996). There is also an “economic premise that the ‘just’ monopoly 
reward provided is (or should be) proportional to the benefit received by society.” Id. 
42. Oddi, supra note 41, at 282. 
43. Id. 
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A. Obstacles to Enforcement 
While patentees operating under the traditional model can and do enforce 
their patents, there are a number of obstacles built into this model. First, because 
the patentee both patents and produces products in a particular industry, infringers 
will often be competitors of the patentee.44 Under these conditions, it is often the 
case that the infringer and the patentee each infringe each other’s patents, creating 
an equilibrium that deters patent enforcement—since enforcement will often be 
met with a countersuit for one’s own infringement.45 Additionally, when the 
patentee both innovates and produces products in the same industry, there is a 
reputational component to enforcement.46 Patentees who enforce more than is the 
norm in their industry might get a reputation as difficult and uncooperative.47 
If a patentee does choose to enforce a patent, there are certain challenges 
inherent in the process. In particular, because patent drafting is an exercise in 
prediction, the patent-in-suit will not always be a perfect candidate for enforcement, 
creating challenges for the patent holder (generally the plaintiff48) during litigation.49 
A key component to the traditional model of patent use is that, when challenges to 
litigating against a certain target arise, the plaintiff must turn to her patent and make 
the best arguments she can in light of constraints posed by the patent as it was 
drafted many years before.50 Patents drafted ex ante are often not perfect fits for 
infringement occurring ex post. Similarly, there is no guarantee that a granted patent 
will in fact be valid.51 It is common in litigation for the defendant to challenge a 
patent’s validity, and common for this argument to succeed.52 A plaintiff may be the 
position of needing to bring suit but only having a patent of dubious validity with 
which to do so. In this circumstance, to bring suit is to risk losing the patent.53 
It is a risk, however, that plaintiffs in the traditional model of patent use must 
take. Given that the patent is already written, the plaintiff must make his best 
arguments for the patent’s validity but cannot avoid the issue. Ultimately, the 
arguments available to the plaintiff, and even the ability to bring suit, are inevitable 
consequences of the patent as written before litigation began. The unavoidable 
 
44. See Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 655, 657 (2009). 
45. Cotropia, supra note 31, at 61–62. 
46. Jacob H. Rooksby, When Tigers Bare Teeth: A Qualitative Study of University Patent 
Enforcement, 46 AKRON L. REV. 169, 172 (2013). 
47. See id. 
48. The patent holder will be the plaintiff in most cases, but infringers can sue for declaratory 
judgment, in which case the patent holder is the defendant. E.g., MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 
549 U.S. 118, 121 (2007). 
49. E.g., John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Understanding the Realities of 
Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1782 (2015). 
50. Id. 
51. See id. 
52. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 85 (2005). 
53. Id. at 76. 
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limits on future enforcement created by the words of the patent as written are the 
quintessence of the traditional view of patent use. 
B. The Traditional Model Breaks Down 
For the past decade, scholars have noted an increasing movement away from 
the traditional model.54 PAEs are entities that do not develop or commercialize 
technology themselves, but instead make money by asserting patents in various, 
possibly socially detrimental, ways.55 PAEs break the link between innovation and 
patenting that is inherent in the traditional model, because instead of patenting their 
own invention, they acquire patents from a variety of sources, including directly 
from the inventor, from a practicing entity that is not using a patent, or through 
bankruptcy proceedings.56 Scholars have suggested that PAEs strategically acquire 
patents but have had limited direct evidence of this.57 
Scholars know that breaking this innovation-patenting link degrades the 
obstacles to enforcement present in the traditional model.58 Because PAEs do not 
produce products, they do not need to worry about countersuits from 
competitors.59 In addition, the absence of PAEs’ physical footprints in an industry 
makes it easier for competitors to accidentally infringe PAE patents. It is difficult 
 
54. The literature can be traced back over a decade. See generally James Bessen, Jennifer Ford  
& Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, 34 REG., no. 4, 2012, at 26; Colleen  
V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech 
Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571 (2009); Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for 
the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (2013); Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent 
Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809 (2007); Robert P. Merges, The Trouble 
with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583 (2009); 
Marc Morgan, Stop Looking Under the Bridge for Imaginary Creatures: A Comment Examining Who 
Really Deserves the Title Patent Troll, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 165 (2007); Kristen Osenga, Formerly 
Manufacturing Entities: Piercing the “Patent Troll” Rhetoric, 47 CONN. L. REV. 435 (2014); Tim 
Pohlmann & Marieke Opitz, Typology of the Patent Troll Business, 43 R&D MGMT. 104 (2013). The 
phenomenon is much older. See Christopher Beauchamp, The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 125 
YALE L.J. 848, 851 (2016). 
55. See Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 611, 613 (2008). 
56. Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 459 (2012); Pohlmann  
& Opitz, supra note 54. 
57. See, e.g., Fiona M. Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Strategic Patent Acquisition, 79 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 463, 470 (2014) (“PAEs seek to keep abreast of industry knowledge and trends so that they can 
locate valuable patents and purchase them inexpensively. Indeed, having good information about 
potential licensees and past licensing deals or settlement terms is critical to the PAE business 
model . . . .”); see also Ted Sichelman, Are Patent Trolls “Opportunistic”?, (San Diego Legal Studies, Paper 
No. 14-175, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2520125 [https://perma.cc/7AH6-8QQV]. 
58. See, e.g., Deborah Platt Majoras, A Government Perspective on IP and Antitrust Law, 38 RUTGERS 
L.J. 493, 498 (2007); Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis of 
Nonpracticing Entities, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 122–23 (2010). 
59. Majoras, supra note 58. 
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to find patents through keyword searches;60 thus, companies planning to 
commercialize a technology might attempt to avoid patent risks in part by reviewing 
the patent portfolios of known competitors.61 PAEs can obscure ownership of 
patents by creating shell companies, which makes it harder for potential infringers 
to find the patent and avoid infringement.62 
Third, PAEs have different motivations for patent litigation. PAEs litigate to 
monetize, that is, they bring patent infringement lawsuits in order to make money.63 
Practicing entities, by contrast, have more complicated motivations for patent 
litigation. While some practicing entities may also litigate to monetize their patent 
portfolio (and this may be an increasingly common practice),64 others litigate to 
protect their own business and products. For example, a manufacturer of a brand 
name pharmaceutical product will sue a generic competitor, because if the generic 
enters the market, the brand name company will lose up to 80% of its market 
share.65 
PAEs have attracted a significant amount of policy attention, much of it 
negative.66 Policy makers are concerned about PAEs because they engage in holdup 
behavior by waiting until a product has been developed and put on the market 
before suing the product’s maker for patent infringement.67 In the words of 
President Obama, PAEs “don’t actually produce anything themselves. They’re just 
trying to essentially leverage and hijack somebody else’s idea and see if they can 
extort some money out of them.”68 
 
60. Janet Freilich, Are There Too Many Patents to Search, NEW PRIV. L. BLOG ( July 2, 2015), http:/
/blogs.law.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/07/02/are-there-too-many-patents-to-search-a-response-
janet-freilich/ [https://perma.cc/AQ8N-3T9H]. 
61. Id. 
62. Jason M. Schultz & Brian J. Love, Brief of Amici Curiae Law, Business, and Economics 
Scholars in Support of Respondents in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., v. CLS Bank International, et. al.,  
4 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L., no. 2, 2015, at 372. 
63. Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The New Complex Patent Ecosystem and 
Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 322 (2010). 
64. Id. 
65. Ernst R. Berndt & Murray L. Aitken, Brand Loyalty, Generic Entry and Price Competition in 
Pharmaceuticals in the Quarter Century After the 1984 Waxman-Hatch Legislation 6 (NBER Working 
Paper Series, Paper No. 16431, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w16431 [https://perma.cc/
P9XH-L2SJ ]. 
66. But not all. There is a well-developed literature on the benefits of PAEs, primarily their 
function in creating a market for patents, which allows small innovators to monetize their patents. See, 
e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz, Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities 
(PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649, 653 (2014); Pohlmann & Opitz, supra note 56, at 103; Risch, supra note 
56, at 459; Shrestha, supra note 58, 115–16. In addition, PAEs serve as a form of contingency-fee lawyer 
by financing patent infringement lawsuits. If a patent owner is “unable or uninterested in filing a lawsuit 
to recover money,” he can “instead sell and assign the patents and related causes of action to” another 
entity, often a PAE. David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 
64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 338–39 (2012). 
67. J.P. Mello, Technology Licensing and Patent Trolls, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 388, 391 (2006). 
68. Gene Sperling, Taking on Patent Trolls to Protect American Innovation, WHITE HOUSE BLOG 
(June 4, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2013/06/04/taking-patent-trolls-
protect-american-innovation [https://perma.cc/7ACT-YBNC]. 
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C. A Market for Patents 
The traditional, ex ante, theory of patent use does not fully describe the 
behavior of certain classes of plaintiffs—for instance, PAEs—who acquire and 
enforce, rather than produce, patents. In order to have this acquisition and 
enforcement, there must be infringed patents available for sale. This Section 
explains that the patent system is characterized by widespread infringement, much 
of which is either inadvertent or unavoidable, but infringement actions are pursued 
relatively rarely, in part because it is difficult for individuals and small companies to 
obtain financing for litigation. The discussion below explores a variety of 
unintuitive features of the patent system that underlie why infringement is 
widespread and underenforced, and why infringement claims are often for sale. 
Almost everyone regularly infringes a patent, which provides a wide range of 
potential actions and defendants that may be brought to court. Have you, the reader, 
picked up a stick from the ground and thrown it for a dog, used it as a walking stick, 
or fenced with a friend? You were infringing a patent.69 Have you used a swing 
hanging from a tree? You were infringing a patent.70 Do you use Wi-Fi? You were 
infringing a patent.71 Do you have a smartphone? You might be infringing hundreds 
of thousands of patents.72 
The causes of widespread infringement are varied. In part, it is due to the 
future-looking nature of patents. Perhaps an early innovator developed, and 
patented, an essential component of Wi-Fi technology. As the technology 
developed, it became ubiquitous, and, consequently, practically everyone might 
infringe the patent. Other causes of widespread infringement are poor quality 
patents and high levels of patenting, resulting in large numbers of patents on basic 
technologies.73 Further, it is difficult to figure out what technologies or actions are 
 
69. U.S. Patent No. 6,360,693 (filed Dec. 2, 1999) (issued Mar. 26, 2002) covers branched sticks. 
Fortunately, this patent was abandoned for failure to pay maintenance fees, and so is not in force. Gene 
Quinn, Patent on a Stick: Learning from the Animal Toy Patent, IP WATCHDOG (Oct. 6, 2010), http://
www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/10/06/animal-toy-patent/id=12711/ [https://perma.cc/4EPC-
TSYU]. In addition, this patent was certainly granted erroneously and was not valid, even when it was 
in force. Id. 
70. U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227 (filed Nov. 17, 2000) (issued Apr. 9, 2002). 
71. The owner of several patents on wireless technologies has started suing end-users of the 
technology such as bakeries and cafes that offer Wi-Fi. Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the End User in 
Patent Litigation, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1443, 1456 (2014). 
72. Colleen Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283, 289 (2011) (“250,000 
patents cover smartphone technology.”). 
73. The number of patents is growing rapidly. Applications rose from 104,329 in 1980 to 
356,943 in 2004. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 68–69 (2008). There are many causes of 
poor-quality patents. Much of the criticism focuses on the small amount of time allocated to examining 
each patent and problematic incentives at the Patent Office. Mark. A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the 
Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1495 (2001); see also Michael D. Frakes & Melissa Wasserman, 
Does Agency Funding Affect Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 66, 80 (2013); Michael Frakes & Melissa Wasserman, The Failed Promise of User  
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covered by patents, and, even if potentially relevant patents can be identified, it is 
difficult to ascertain precisely what the boundaries of these patents are in order to 
avoid infringing.74 
Widespread infringement occurs not only because many patents cover many 
different technologies but also because many patents overlap to cover particular 
intellectual areas.75 It is common for several different parties to file overlapping 
patents covering one technology from different angles (called a “patent thicket”).76 
It is also common for companies to seek multiple overlapping patents to protect a 
product from all angles.77 The result of overlapping patents is that one activity 
frequently infringes on many patents, often owned by many different  
patent-holders. 
Although infringement is widespread, patents are consistently underenforced. 
There are many reasons for underenforcement.78 Companies in the business of 
 
Fees: Empirical Evidence from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 602,  
603 (2014). 
74. Patentees can choose their own words (even if these are non-standard) to describe  
their inventions, so keyword searches may not be effective to find patents. See Vitronics  
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also Christina Mulligan & Timothy 
B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 289, 317 (2012). But see Ted Sichelman, 
Are There Too Many Patents to Search? – A Response, HARV. BLOGS: NEW PRIV. L. ( July 3, 2015), 
https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/07/02/are-there-too-many-patents-to-search-a-
response-ted-sichelman/ [https://perma.cc/C6G7-DM8X] (arguing that it is feasible to conduct 
patent clearance searches). In addition, the boundaries of individual patents are fuzzy, in part because 
it is difficult to define inventions with absolute clarity and in part because it can be to the patentee’s 
advantage to inject some ambiguity into the patent. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134  
S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014) (“absent a meaningful definiteness check, we are told, patent applicants face 
powerful incentives to inject ambiguity into their claims”). This makes it challenging for third parties to 
know whether they are infringing. 
75. E.g., John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439,  
442–43 (2004) (calling “overlapping exclusive rights” a “basic feature of patent law”); see also Michael  
A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical 
Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998) (describing “a spiral of overlapping patent claims in the hands 
of different owners, reaching ever further upstream in the course of biomedical research”); Michael  
J. Meurer, Business Method Patents and Patent Floods, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 309, 324 (2002) 
(“[N]umerous and overlapping patents make it costly for a possible infringer to negotiate a 
license . . . .”). 
76. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard 
Setting, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern, 
eds., 2001) (“In several key industries . . . our patent system is creating a patent thicket: an overlapping 
set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from 
multiple patentees.”). 
77. For example, pharmaceutical companies developing a new drug often patent first the 
molecule used in the drug, then separately patent use of the molecule to treat the relevant disease, 
formulating the molecule in a particular way, specific doses of the molecule, and other variations on 
this theme. Katherine Gaudry, Evergreening: A Common Practice to Protect New Drugs 3 (2011), http://
nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8965556 [https://perma.cc/5BNP-UMH8]; see also Robin 
Feldman, Rethinking Rights in Biospace, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 30 (2005); C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven  
N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH  
ECON. 327, 327–28 (2012). 
78. Clark D. Asay, Patent Pacifism, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 645, 660 (2017). 
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commercializing a product may not have the interest or expertise to pursue 
infringers who are not direct competitors. These same companies may fear the 
reputational costs of enforcement, or they may fear countersuit if they too are 
infringing patents. Small companies may have insufficient financing for 
enforcement actions. Patent infringement suits are expensive (a median of $4 
million in litigation fees for lawsuits with more than $25 million at issue)79 due to 
many factors such as long pendency, complexity, and the need to hire expensive 
expert witnesses.80 Thus, while tort lawsuits are often financed on a contingency fee 
basis, patent infringement (also a tort) has historically not been a candidate for 
contingent fee financing.81 Widespread infringement and consistent 
underenforcement are so common that in practice, companies in some industries 
simply “ignore patents,” making no effort to evade infringement.82 
Widespread infringement and underenforcement are essential components in 
the market for patents and patent claims because they create a pool of potentially 
lucrative enforcement opportunities that are not presently being exploited. Those 
opportunities may have value to buyers. Further, the inability of innovators to 
enforce their patents incentivizes innovators to sell patents to other parties who 
may have the resources and desire to enforce previously ignored claims. 
A third important component to the patent market is the ability to freely buy 
and sell patents. Both patents and claims for past infringement of a patent are fully 
assignable.83 To illustrate, Company A has been infringing on Company B’s patent 
for three years, and Company B has not enforced the patent, either out of ignorance 
of the infringement or inability to enforce against known infringement. Company B 
can now sell the patent to a third party, who can sue Company A for the past three 
years of infringing behavior, even though the third party did not own the patent 
when the infringement occurred.84 Alienability of claims allows innovators to 
 
79. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASSOC., REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 22 (2003). 
80. Schwartz, supra note 66, at 348. 
81. Id. at 338. 
82. Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21–22 (2008) (“[B]oth 
researchers and companies in component industries simply ignore patents. Virtually everyone does 
it . . . . Nor do they conduct a search before launching their own product. Rather, they wait and see if 
any patent owner claims that the new product infringes their patent.”). 
83. Schwartz, supra note 66, at 350 (“In patent law, the owner of a patent may sell and assign 
the patent and the right to obtain past damages. The purchaser of these rights may then assert the patent 
in litigation. The rule in most other tort contexts is the opposite.”); see also Mentor H/S,  
Inc. v. Med. Devices All., Inc., 240 F.3d 1016, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
84. This sort of assignment of causes of action was historically disfavored by common law, 
though over the years the prohibition has narrowed. See Anthony Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64  
VAND. L. REV. 61, 72 (2011). 
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monetize their patents through sale85 and provides a legal mechanism for third 
parties to purchase and enforce patents.86 
In sum, companies infringe frequently, patent owners rarely enforce, and 
patent claims are freely alienable. These conditions foster a market in patents where 
shoppers can buy un- or underenforced patent claims. 
* * * 
The traditional model of patent use involves an innovator inventing, patenting, 
and finally enforcing. However, scholars are aware of at least one type of  
player—the PAE—that has broken out of the traditional model. This break from 
the traditional model is enabled by widespread conditions of the patent system. This 
Article argues that PAE behavior is a subset of a more universal  
phenomenon: patent shopping. In the following Section, I describe and characterize 
patent shopping as an overarching model that applies not to specific PAEs but to 
their actions more broadly and that is generalizable beyond PAEs. 
II. PATENT SHOPPING 
A. The Model 
As explored above, the traditional, ex ante, model of patent use comprises 
three chronological steps: (1) the inventor obtains a patent on the invention;  
(2) third parties infringe on the patent; and (3) the inventor enforces the patent. By 
contrast, the shopping, ex post, model of patent use reverses the first two steps: (1) 
third parties infringe on a patent; (2) a (soon-to-be) plaintiff acquires a patent; and 
(3) the plaintiff enforces the patent. 
The inventor in the traditional model must predict what infringement will look 
like when she is drafting her patent. Crucially, she is then limited by the patent as it 
 
85. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, A Market-Oriented Revision of the Patent System, 21 UCLA  
L. REV. 1042, 1051 (1974) (“A secure, fully alienable patent will provide an attractive alternative to 
investors and thus give a new invention an equal chance to compete for capital with existing products.”). 
86. See Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1413–15 (2009) 
(stating, in the context of non-practicing entities, that “[t]he ability to use things that one owns to 
‘extract money’ is of course the essence of alienability”). 
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was drafted. By contrast, the plaintiff in the shopping model acquires a patent in 
response to a known act of infringement and can react to infringement by selecting 
a patent that fits the infringing act. He is not bound by the scope and validity of any 
one patent because, if one patent does not fit the infringing act well, he can  
select another. 
Shopping can only occur under certain conditions, which are common but are 
not available to all plaintiffs. First, a large pool of patents, covering many common 
activities, must exist. Second, many third parties must frequently infringe patents in 
this pool. Third, the plaintiff must be able to access this pool, either because he has 
the resources to acquire patents from this pool, or because he already owns the pool 
as his patent portfolio. 
For shoppers, the process of getting a patent granted, or the content of any 
one patent, is not particularly relevant. Instead, these plaintiffs begin by identifying 
a litigation target. The litigation target may be a deep-pocketed defendant, a 
particularly bitter competitor, or a widespread activity that infringes on a heavily 
patented area. Once the litigation target is identified, the plaintiff selects, either 
through acquisition or from a group of patents already in its possession, a patent 
that is “good” for litigation. This may mean a patent that covers commercially 
important activity and may, therefore, be used to obtain significant damages. It may 
mean a patent that, after due diligence, is deemed likely to be valid. It may mean a 
patent that covers a broad range of common activity, making it easier to prove 
infringement. It may mean some combination of the above. The plaintiff then 
asserts this patent either through licensing demands or in litigation. 
Note that the shopping model can apply either to individual patents or to 
patent portfolios. A patent shopper might choose to acquire a particular patent 
because it possesses desirable characteristics, or might choose to acquire a portfolio 
because the portfolio has particular features of interest. For example, a portfolio 
might be acquired because, in the aggregate, it covers a highly infringed space. This 
Article uses individual patents for most of the analysis below, but the analysis applies 
similarly if “portfolio” is substituted for “patent.” 
Additionally, the shopping model can apply to purchases of weak patents. 
While some types of patentees seek strong patents that can survive a court challenge, 
there is a subset of patentees who survive by filing nuisance suits or sending out 
widespread demand letters premised on infringement of patents unlikely to be 
actually infringed or valid. These two types of patentees would shop along different 
criteria. The former might look for a high-quality patent that is likely to be valid. 
The latter often makes money through quantity, by sending out thousands of 
demand letters or filing large numbers of suits and hoping that at least a portion of 
the targets will settle for a small sum of money irrespective of the merits of the 
suit.87 Thus, these patentees might try to select a patent that covered more 
widespread behavior. Even if the patent is invalid, proving that the patent is invalid 
 
87. Bernstein, supra note 71, at 1451. 
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is expensive,88 thus, many may settle. These patentees might also deliberately shop 
for vague and ambiguous patents. Such patents would allow them to target a large 
number of potential defendants who might find it cheaper to settle than to get 
counsel’s opinion about the precise meaning of the vague patent language. 
Alternatively, these shoppers might seek volume at a low price, such as a large 
portfolio being sold relatively inexpensively. 
Patent shopping has not previously been explored in the patent literature, but 
the contents of the model will not be unfamiliar to legal scholars. It has many 
analogs in other areas of law. In a sense, shopping is roughly analogous to a 
contingency fee lawyer conducting due diligence on a potential client before 
determining whether or not to bring the case. The lawyer can review the client’s 
claims and use her substantive legal knowledge to assess both the likelihood of 
winning and the potential size of the damage award. A lawyer starting out may have 
only one or two potential clients and, therefore, will take any case that has a chance, 
even if the returns are likely to be small. A well-known lawyer with many clients 
seeking his services will be able to select the cases he believes are winnable and will 
bring large returns. Shopping similarly has analogs in both criminal and tort law. 
Many scholars have written about how criminal law’s combination of overbreadth 
and prosecutorial discretion results in selective enforcement and discrimination 
against certain groups.89 Tort law is characterized by a similar pattern, rates of 
claiming are low, and tortfeasors who end up in court are generally those with “deep 
pockets.”90 
Patent shopping is a model, and, as such, it makes a variety of simplifying 
assumptions about the world. While patent shopping does occur, it is not as 
straightforward or predictable as depicted by some of the hypotheticals in this 
Article. In particular, it is not easy to determine the universe of patents available for 
sale, evaluate those patents, and negotiate for acquisition of patents at a reasonable 
price. It is further challenging to evaluate patents and determine whether they are 
likely to be infringed and valid. Moreover, instances of infringement are often 
invisible without discovery. Patent shoppers have experience and expertise in 
evaluating patents and patent monetization opportunities. 
B. Qualitative Study of Patent Shopping 
Having set out the basic model of patent shopping, this Section explores 
qualitative evidence of patent acquisition and enforcement patterns and strategies. 
This is a qualitative study both because it is difficult to obtain quantitative data on 
patent shopping91 and because qualitative research is often better suited to 
 
88. Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91  
MINN. L. REV. 101, 116–17 (2006). 
89. Frase, supra note 28, at 246–47. 
90. Abel, supra note 29, at 447. 
91. In part because patent transfers between parties (“assignment”) need not be recorded in the 
USPTO’s assignment database. Alan C. Marco et al., The USPTO Patent Assignment  
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observation of strategy. Though patent shopping is a novel way to describe the 
behavior of players in the patent system, entities who perform some of the steps 
involved in patent shopping, namely patent acquisition and monetization, are well 
known in the literature: PAEs. In order to obtain evidence of patent shopping, data 
were gathered from a review of all 2015 SEC filings for public patent assertion 
entities.92 Below, this Section begins with an overview of PAEs and previous 
research on patent acquisition strategies, proceeds to a discussion of the study’s 
design and methodology, and then summarizes the results. 
1. Patent Assertion Entities 
The PAE world is complex. PAE is a broad (overly broad) category that covers 
many different types of entities.93 PAEs are often divided according to the nature 
of their business. Mark Lemley and Nathan Myhrvold have developed a taxonomy 
of patent plaintiffs, which divides PAEs into categories such as “failed product 
company,” “individual inventor,” “IP subsidiary of a product company,” “acquired 
patent,” and others.94 This Article is focused on the subset of PAEs who acquire 
and enforce patents: the patent shoppers. 
PAEs can be divided into (at least) two categories according to their 
acquisition and litigation strategies. First, there are “big game hunter” PAEs,95 those 
who seek to “strike it big in court. These entities believe that they have a patent that 
reads on a significant area of technology, and it is very important to them that their 
patent be held valid and infringed.”96 A second type of PAE is the “bottom-feeder,” 
who files large numbers of suits with no expectation of going to trial, and hopes to 
elicit relatively small settlements with high frequency.97 Both types of PAEs can 
engage in patent shopping behavior. 
2. Study Design and Methodology 
Because PAEs are known to acquire and enforce patents, they have the 
potential to behave like patent shoppers and are the target of this qualitative study. 
 
Dataset: Descriptions and Analysis 2 (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Working Paper No. 2015–2, 
2015) (explaining that recorded patent assignments are “executed (optionally) by an interested 
party . . .”). 
92. A list of public PAEs is available from RPX. RPX, Q3 2015 Public PAE Report (2015), 
available at https://www.rpxcorp.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/12/RPX-Public-PAE-
Report-Q3-2015-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2YX-MYNN]. 
93. For more information on the full taxonomy of PAEs, see Chien, supra note 52, at 1571; 
Cotropia, Kesan & Schwartz, supra note 66, at 656–58; Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman & Joshua Walker, 
The America Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE  
L. & TECH. REV. 357, 366–67 (2013); Osenga, supra note 54, at 437–38; Lemley, supra note 55, at 613. 
94. Described in John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and 
Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 683–84 (2011). 
95. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Cost from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL  
L. REV. 387, 405 (2014). 
96. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 54, at 2126. 
97. Id. 
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A list of all public PAEs was obtained from RPX Corporation, a patent aggregator 
that issues reports on PAE practices. RPX’s report lists twenty-three public PAEs 
in 2015.98 Of these, fifteen are in the business of monetizing patents that were 
developed either by the company itself or by a predecessor, and their financial 
statements do not discuss patent acquisition. These companies are therefore less 
relevant for an evaluation of patent shopping and are not analyzed in detail below. 
The remaining eight companies are in the business of acquiring patents for 
enforcement (though some also monetize patents that were developed in-house). 
The business strategies of these eight companies, as assessed from their financial 
statements, are explored below. All eight companies very explicitly describe a 
strategy of patent shopping. 
3. Results 
As described above, the traditional, ex ante model of patent use is characterized 
by three chronological steps: (1) patent acquisition; (2) patent infringement; and (3) 
patent enforcement. By contrast, the shopping, ex post model flips the order of the 
first steps: (1) patent infringement; (2) patent acquisition; (3) patent enforcement. 
This allows patent acquisition to respond to infringement, rather than predict 
infringement. Below, the patent acquisition and enforcement strategies for each 
studied PAE are described in vignettes. Each PAE is explicit that it begins by 
surveying patent infringement and then responds to this infringement by acquiring 
patents which it then enforces. This chronology makes apparent that the PAEs 
follow the ex post patent shopping model, rather than the ex ante tradition model of 
patent use. 
 Acacia, one of the oldest and largest PAEs,99 is a public company that describes 
its business as “focus[ing] solely on the patent marketplace . . . as a leading outsource 
patent licensing and enforcement company for patent owners.”100 The business 
strategy has all of the components of the patent shopping model described  
above: (1) infringement; (2) acquisition; and (3) enforcement. Acacia begins by 
identifying patents that have or are expected to have economically enticing 
enforcement opportunities, conducts a detailed evaluation of the patents, acquires 
the patents, and enforces the patents.101 In Acacia’s words  
 
98. InterDigital (IDCC), Tessera (TSRA), Rambus (RMBS), Rovi (ROVI), Acacia (ACTG), 
WiLan (WILN), Pendrell (PCO), VirnetX (VHC), Unwired Planet (UPIP), SITO Mobile (SITO), 
Vringo (VRNG), Network-1 (NTIP), ITUS (ITUS), Finjan Holdings (FNJN), Crossroads Systems 
(CRDS), Marathon Patent Group (MARA), ParkerVision (PRKR), Inventergy (INVT), Spherix 
(SPEX), Document Security Systems (DSS), Patriotic Scientific (PTSC), Walker Innovation (WLKR), 
Endeavor IP( ENIP). 
99. Michael A. Carrier, Patent Assertion Entities: Six Actions the Antitrust Agencies Can Take, 
2013 CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 1, 3 (2013); Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 15 (2012) (“Acacia Research Corporation likely represents the first modern 
mass aggregator.”). 
100. Acacia Research Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Mar. 15, 2016) [hereinafter 
“Acacia 10-K”]. 
101. Id. at 4–9. 
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[We] actively seek to identify high-quality but undervalued patent 
portfolios in a variety of industries. We combine our legal expertise, 
technology expertise, and our extensive knowledge of, and expertise 
in, the patent licensing ecosystem, to continually uncover important 
patent assets and bring needed proficiency to patent licensing and 
enforcement.102 
The first step in Acacia’s business model is “Patent Discovery.”103 On 
occasion the patent holders themselves reach out to Acacia “seeking assistance with 
the monetization or enforcement” of patents or portfolios, or alternatively, Acacia 
“reach[es] out to patent holders who may be disenfranchised.”104 Acacia employees 
seek to “identify core, patented technologies that have been or are anticipated to be 
widely adopted by third-parties in connection with the manufacture, sale or use of 
products and services.”105 In the context of the patent shopping model, this means 
that Acacia is searching for patents or portfolios that are (or are expected to be) 
widely infringed and where that infringement is not yet being monetized through 
licensing or litigation. 
Acacia then does extensive due diligence on the patent or portfolio, either 
using its own “staff of in-house business development executives, patent attorneys, 
patent licensing executives, and technology engineers” or contracting with “external 
specialists and technology consultants.”106 Acacia specifically focuses on evaluating 
infringement, validity, and enforceability.107 For infringement, Acacia explains that 
it must “identify third-parties that are practicing the invention(s) covered by the 
patent without obtaining permission from the patent owner to do so.”108 Acacia 
considers the “types of claims and the number of claims potentially infringed by 
third-parties,” as well as “potential infringers, industries in which the potential 
infringers exist, longevity of the patented technology” and other factors that 
“directly impact the magnitude . . . of a licensing and enforcement program.”109 The 
company additionally identifies future infringement that may arise, particularly 
“growth areas where patented technologies will play a vital role in connection with 
the manufacture or sale of products or services.”110 Acacia “estimate[s] a patent’s 
economic value by evaluating the expected value of . . . past, present, and future 
revenue of infringing products and services” discounted by the “risk that a court 
will disagree with our . . . assessments of the patent.”111 Crucially, this due diligence 
is all done “before the decision is made to allocate resources to a patent portfolio 
 
102. Id. at 5. 
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investment.”112 Thus, Acacia seeks to identify infringement and enforcement 
opportunities prior to acquiring the patent. 
Acacia is an expert in evaluation of infringement opportunities and 
identification of patents that can be effectively enforced to capitalize on these 
opportunities. The “inherently complex nature of patent law” can make this task 
challenging, but “we employ our wealth of expertise to make the best assessment 
possible.”113 
If due diligence goes well, Acacia acquires the patent. The nature of the 
transaction varies, including arrangements where Acacia “partner[s] with a patent 
portfolio owner, acquiring rights in the patent portfolio” or instances where Acacia 
“acquir[es] the patent portfolio outright.”114 
Once Acacia has acquired a patent, it seeks to monetize the asset through 
licensing or litigation.115 Acacia boasts “a proven track record of licensing success 
with more than 1,490 license agreements.”116 However, monetization often requires 
litigation: “As a result of the common reluctance of patent infringers to negotiate 
and ultimately take a patent license for the use of patented technologies without at 
least the threat of legal action, patent licensing and enforcement often begins with 
the filing of patent enforcement litigation.”117 
Acacia is not alone in pursuing a strategy of patent shopping. A number of 
other publicly traded companies reveal similar strategies in their financial 
statements. For example, Marathon Patent Group is “technology agnostic” and 
“special[izes in] patents and patent monetization”118; it has a “[s]trong patent 
acquisition pipeline with a proprietary process to value patent assets.”119 
Like Acacia, Marathon searches for patents that have been infringed, or are 
likely to be infringed, and then acquires and enforces the patents. Marathon explains 
that “the patents and patent rights that we seek to acquire have large identifiable 
targets who are or have been using technology that we believe infringes our patents 
and patent rights.”120 Marathon’s business model has two primary elements: “the 
identification, analysis and acquisition of patents and patent rights” followed by the 
 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 4. 
115. Id. at 7. 
116. Id. at 3. 
117. Id. at 5. 
118. Would Marathon Be Interested in My Patent?, MARATHON PATENT GRP. (2016), https://
web.archive.org/web/20160429142236/http://www.marathonpg.com/for-patent-owners/would-
marathon-be-interested-in-my-patent [https://perma.cc/8NRS-JXJ8 ]. 
119. Investor Presentation, MARATHON PATENT GRP. 3 (Feb. 2015), http://
content.stockpr.com/marathonpg/media/6d823f116830875ff10328470858cf27.pdf [https://
perma.cc/77BY-7BZ8]. 
120. Marathon Patent Grp., Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2015 (Form 10-K), at 1 (Mar. 30, 2016) 
[hereinafter Marathon Annual Report ]. 
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“generation of revenue from the acquired patents or patent rights.”121 Marathon has 
been successful in acquiring over 300 patents and “intend[s] to add more  
patents . . . to [its] portfolio for the purpose of generating additional revenues from 
assertion of claims against infringers.”122 
Part of Marathon’s strategy relies on obtaining early and exclusive access to 
patent markets. Marathon has “worked to establish a supply of patent acquisition 
opportunities with patent brokers and dealers.”123 Marathon also relies on a 
sophisticated proprietary method of conducting due diligence on patents. “Our 
portfolio evaluation involves an initial screening with our analytics  
platform . . . followed by internal technical analysis.”124 The platform “is comprised 
of approximately 120 factors, and it has been continuously updated using actual 
observations.”125 Marathon conducts this due diligence “before the decision is made 
to allocate resources to an acquisition.”126 Of particular interest during due diligence 
is to “identify potential infringers; [and] industries within which the potential 
infringers exist.”127 After acquisition, Marathon monetizes patents by “entering into 
licensing discussions, and if that is unsuccessful, initiating enforcement activities.”128 
Essentially, Marathon has created a series of relationships with potential patent 
sellers coupled with advanced due diligence techniques to identify patents that are 
infringed and then acquire and enforce these patents. 
Similar to Marathon, Inventergy is a company “focused on developing 
relationships . . . with leading companies . . . who lack expertise in IP 
monetization.”129 These companies may have “significant patent asset portfolios in 
areas that are no longer of strategic value to the client,”130 and thus, potentially 
available for sale to Inventergy. Inventergy seeks patent portfolios in  
“strong-margin, high-growth segments of particular industry sectors.”131 Before 
acquiring a patent, Inventergy “reviews the patent assets” and studies “patents of 
prospective clients and evaluate[s] overall patent strength, the size of the 
appropriate addressable market(s), [and] the reasonably probable revenue.”132 
Inventergy is particularly concerned about identifying infringing behavior 
before acquiring the patent. It hunts for patents that “have clearly been adopted and 
built upon by other market participants”133 and have legal and technical teams to 
“help[ ] analyze the products and services of prospective licensees [i.e., 
 
121. Id. at 2. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 3. 
126. Id. 
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128. Id. at 1. 
129. Inventergy Glob., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 7 (Apr. 4, 2016). 
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infringers].”134 These teams also “analyze[ ] patent claims and determine[ ] how these 
claims relate to products, services and industry standards.”135 Inventergy concludes 
that a key element of its business strategy is “[l]everaging our management’s 
expertise to select . . . patent assets.”136 
Another example of patent shopping comes from Endeavor IP. Endeavor’s 
“activities generally include the acquisition and development of patents, and the 
monetization of those patents.”137 It “will seek to acquire existing rights to 
intellectual property through the acquisition of already issued patents and pending 
patent applications.”138 
Endeavor particularly looks for patents that are presently being infringed by a 
large number of companies or are likely to become infringed soon. “[W]e will 
identify core, patented technologies that have been or are anticipated to be widely 
adopted by third parties in connection with the manufacture or sale of products and 
services.”139 As part of this process, and during its “patent evaluation process,” they 
give “significant consideration . . . to the identification of potential infringers” and 
“industries within which the potential infringers exist.”140 Endeavor also attempts 
to “identify potential problem areas [such as prior art] . . . and determine whether 
potential problem areas can be overcome, prior to acquiring a patent portfolio.”141 
When the evaluation process is complete, Endeavor “may elect to purchase 
the patented technology.”142 After acquisition, Endeavor enforces the patents by 
“present[ing] the claims of [its] patents and demonstrat[ing] how they apply to 
companies we believe are using our technologies in their products or services.”143 
Endeavor is comfortable with both licensing negotiations or litigation: “These 
presentations can take place in a non-adversarial business setting, but can also occur 
through the litigation process, if necessary.”144 
Tessera Technologies, Inc. is another PAE involved in patent shopping. 
Tessera’s strategy is to “evaluate intellectual property portfolios for purchase in the 
fields of advanced semiconductor packaging, circuity technologies, and related 
fields.”145 It conducts these evaluations using specific criteria including “sales and 
profitability of the relevant products . . . size of the portfolio, legal criteria  
and . . . the likelihood of obtaining negotiated licenses.”146 Tessera acknowledges 
 
134. Id. at 8. 
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137. Endeavor IP, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 ( Jan. 28, 2016) [hereinafter Endeavor 
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that the success of its business “depends on our ability to continue to develop and 
acquire high quality patent portfolios” but that “competition for acquiring high 
quality patent portfolios is intense.”147 
Another example is Network-1, whose strategy “is to focus on acquiring high 
quality patents which management believes have the potential to generate 
significant licensing opportunities.”148 The company “continually review[s] 
opportunities to acquire or license additional intellectual property.”149 Network-1 
notes that patent acquisition is not an easy business 
Acquisitions of patent assets are competitive, time consuming, complex 
and costly to consummate. Our strategy is to focus on acquiring high 
quality patent assets which management believes have the potential for 
significant licensing opportunities. These high quality patent opportunities 
are difficult to find and are often very competitive to acquire.150 
Other companies are also patent shoppers. For example, Finjan intends to 
acquire “IP portfolios or other assets” and 
identify relevant security technologies and patents that have been, or are 
anticipated to be, widely adopted by third parties in connection with the 
manufacture or sale of products and services, and to which we can bring 
enforcement actions.151 
Similarly, Spherix Inc., a “patent commercialization company” has a strategy 
of “acquiring IP from patent holders” and then “managing a licensing campaign, 
or . . . settlement and litigation of patents.”152 Spherix specifically wishes to acquire 
patents from companies who had not been able to “effectively address the 
unauthorized use of their patented technologies.”153 
It is clear from these companies’ own descriptions of their business strategies 
that they engage in patent shopping. They are explicitly looking for instances of 
infringement before purchasing and enforcing patents. The business practices 
above are all clear examples of patent shopping. 
C. Extending the Model 
PAEs are not the only entities that can use a patent shopping strategy. This 
Section explores how the shopping model can be extended to other types of 
patentees. Specifically, this Section focuses on defensive aggregators, entities with 
large patent portfolios, and the practice of filing continuation applications. 
 
147. Id. at 8. 
148. Network-1 Tech., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (Mar. 30, 2016). 
149. Id. at 1. 
150. Id. at 16. 
151. Finjan Holdings, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 9 (Mar. 26, 2016). 
152. Spherix Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (Mar. 29, 2016). 
153. Id. at 3. 
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1. Defensive Aggregators 
Defensive aggregation is a relatively new business model with few players, 
though the field is growing.154 Defensive aggregators characterize themselves as 
“fighting patent trolls”155 and are in the business of protecting their clients against 
assertions of patent infringement. Defensive aggregators acquire large numbers of 
patents in order to guarantee that their clients will not be sued for infringement of 
those patents.156 Clients are generally large practicing entities that are frequent 
targets of PAEs.157 
Defensive aggregators operate in a manner remarkably similar to the PAE 
patent shoppers described above, except that instead of acquiring patents with the 
goal of enforcing the patents, they acquire patents with the goal of preventing them 
from being enforced. However, the core of the shopping strategy is the same. 
Defensive aggregators seek patents that are likely being infringed or likely will be 
infringed and then acquire those patents. They succeed at their business because 
they have access to a market with many patents. 
The parallels between the defensive aggregator strategy and PAE patent 
shopping behavior is clear from review of the financial statements of RPX 
Corporation, the only public patent aggregator.158 RPX describes its core business 
as one “in which we acquire patents and licenses to patents that are being or may 
be asserted against our current and prospective clients.”159 RPX reports that the 
substantial majority of its acquisitions “involved patent assets that we believed were 
relevant to multiple clients and/or prospective clients.”160 
RPX “closely track[s] patent assets that become available on the market” and 
has “reviewed more than 7,700 patent portfolios” since its inception.161 This 
“familiarity provides us early notice of patent portfolios that are entering the 
market.”162 Once RPX becomes aware of these portfolios, it applies a “rigorous and 
disciplined approach to evaluating acquisition opportunities.”163 In particular, RPX 
uses a “proprietary methodology” to determine the “costs our clients might incur 
from potential assertions of those patents if we were not to acquire them.”164 RPX 
also determines “the degree to which patent claims may describe technologies 
incorporated in clients’ products or services,” and “the legal quality of the patents 
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and their likely validity.”165 They continue to “refin[e] [their] processes for 
identifying potentially valuable patent assets” in order to serve their clients by 
shopping for patents that are being infringed or may be infringed.166 
2. Patent Portfolios 
Thus far, patent shopping has been discussed in the context of shoppers who 
acquire patents from other entities. However, the patent shopping model can be 
extended to patentees who own extensive patent portfolios and shop in their own 
closet by choosing an appropriate patent (or patents) for enforcement from among 
hundreds or thousands of patents. This Section begins by summarizing literature on 
patent portfolios, and then explains how the patent shopping model can be 
extended to companies owning large patent portfolios. Because companies with 
large patent portfolios have many business functions apart from patent 
monetization, it is difficult to find evidence that these companies engage in patent 
shopping from review of their financial statements. Thus, this section instead gives 
a theoretical explanation for why companies with large patent portfolios are able to 
engage in patent shopping and also cites several statements by representatives of 
these companies that suggest that the companies do so. 
a. Literature on Portfolios 
Years ago, studies of patents came up against a puzzling  
observation: individual patents are worth less than the cost of filing the patent, and 
yet firms continue to file patents on a large scale.167 Gideon Parchomovsky and 
Polk Wagner pioneered the “portfolio” theory of patent use, suggesting that the 
value of patent ownership lies not in individual patents but in ownership of a patent 
portfolio.168 They propose that portfolios operate as a “super-patent,” providing the 
ability to exclude over a broad range.169 Portfolios are both “sizeable,” meaning that 
any patents within a patent portfolio cover closely related areas,170 and they are 
“diverse,” meaning that they include patents covering a number of different subject 
areas.171 Portfolio scale-effects create more value than would be suggested by merely 
adding together the value of individual patents.172 
 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 7. 
167. Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005). 
168. Id. at 31. 
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Ideally, “the breadth of the right to exclude conferred by a patent portfolio is 
essentially the sum of the individual patent rights”173 and each patent seamlessly 
abuts or slightly overlaps with its neighbor to create a broad area of protection174 
(picture the scales on a turtle’s shell). The broader aggregate scope of the portfolio 
increases the chance that the portfolio owner will be able to prove infringement of 
any one patent in the portfolio.175 Holders of large patent portfolios may, therefore, 
“have an inherent advantage over competitors that hold a small number of 
individual patents.”176 The broader diversity of the portfolio increases the number 
of different instances of infringement that can be targeted in enforcement 
proceedings. This similarly provides an advantage to the holders of large  
patent portfolios. 
Patent portfolios may arise from internal company research, or from outside 
acquisition.177 Outside acquisition may occur when firms purchase individual 
patents or small groups of patents, or when firms acquire large portfolios owned by 
another company.178 For example, in 2011, Google bought Motorola Mobility’s 
patent portfolio of over 17,000 patents.179 Patent portfolios have grown very large; 
Microsoft has over 50,000 patents,180 IBM obtained over 25,000 patents between 
1994 and 2004, while Canon obtained around 15,000 over the same period.181 
However, research has shown that even smaller portfolios (holding dozens or 
hundreds of patents) can provide aggregate benefits beyond the mere number of 
individual patents.182 Some PAEs also own large patent portfolios. For example, 
Intellectual Ventures has acquired over 70,000 patents.183 
b. Portfolio Owners as Shoppers 
Companies with large patent portfolios are shoppers, selecting individual 
patents from within the large portfolio to assert in litigation. Good patent 
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portfolios—those that are both sizeable and diverse—will include patents covering 
a number of different subject areas.184 As a result, a large portfolio will cover both 
many different instances of infringement and will cover each individual instance of 
infringement with multiple patents. This allows the owners of large portfolios to 
select the preferred patents from an assortment of potentially enforceable patents. 
The power of a sizeable and diverse portfolio can be seen by examining the 
patent portfolio owned by Koninklijke Philips N.V. (Philips), a “diversified 
technology company” that makes a variety of healthcare, consumer and lighting 
products.185 Philips has a large portfolio of at least 25,000 U.S. Patents.186 The 
portfolio spans a wide range of different technologies. For example, Philips owns 
patents on audio and video technologies such as MP3, MPEG, and text-to-speech, 
communications technologies such as smart metering and 4G cellular technologies, 
lighting technologies such as LEDs and luminescent solar concentrators (smart 
glass that dims automatically in bright sunlight), smartphone and tablet technologies 
such as touch screens and other user features, and home technologies such as 
televisions, remote controls, and voice control applications.187 Thus, most people 
use many different technologies patented by Philips on a daily basis. 
Philips’ portfolio not only covers many different technologies but it also 
includes clusters of many different patents covering a particular technology. In this 
manner, a person going about their daily routine might do many different infringing 
activities but will also infringe on many different patents with each activity. For 
example, In re Princo found that the defendant’s use of recordable and rewritable 
compact disks infringed at least five Philips patents.188 The patents cover core 
technologies and overlap such that it is “highly implausible if not impossible as a 
practical matter” to avoid infringing on the patents.189 When Philips litigates using 
these patents, it is therefore able to prove infringement easily, with the court stating 
that it was “clear that Defendants” products contained certain features of the 
patent.190 It is perhaps not surprising that Philips was able to win easily, because 
Philips owns 4% of the total number of U.S. granted patents in this subject area.191 
 
184. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 167, at 41. 
185. Koninklijke Philips N.V., Philips Proposes to Change Company Name to Koninklijke Philips 
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patents assigned to Philips having that classification by the total number of US granted patents having 
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The result is that the owners of large patent portfolios can be shoppers. They 
can select particular instances of infringement; for example, hypothetically Philips 
could sue someone for using a cell phone, for using a television, for using a remote 
control, for turning on a light, and many other activities.192 Since not everyone will 
infringe on all areas of a patent portfolio, having patents covering many different 
areas give the portfolio owners the opportunity to enforce a patent against many 
different parties engaging in many different behaviors. Once a particular infringing 
behavior is identified, there is once again a selection opportunity:193 the infringing 
behavior likely infringes on several overlapping patents; therefore, the portfolio 
owner can bring litigation using one or all of the patents. The portfolio owner can 
choose which patents to use for litigation along a number of different criteria, but 
they will likely involve some evaluation of whether the patent is likely to be valid, 
how easy it will be to prove infringement of the patent, and what types of patents 
will yield the greatest damages. 
A striking example of how large patent portfolios can be used to ensure patent 
infringement comes from the famous dispute between IBM and Sun 
Microsystems.194 IBM asserted seven patents, to which Sun responded that these 
patents were not infringed and were invalid.195 IBM replied that even if “you don’t 
infringe these seven patents . . . we have 10,000 U.S. patents” and can “find seven 
patents you do infringe,” unless “you want to make this easy and just pay us  
$20 million.”196 
Other companies with large patent portfolios can similarly leverage them to 
ensure infringement. In litigation between Microsoft and Barnes & Noble, 
Barnes & Noble argues that Microsoft has never definitively identified 
which of Microsoft’s over 65,000 patents are infringed . . . Bames [sic]  
& Noble contends that even though the patents are “trivial” it cannot work 
around them because Microsoft has said that it would simply come forward 
with other patents to assert against Barnes & Noble.197 
 
IPC classifications in question, for an average of 4.2%. Note that this raises antitrust concerns.  
Id. at 181. 
192. This is hypothetical. Many of these acts would not be infringing because the manufacturer 
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In this manner, companies with large patent portfolios can use a shopping 
strategy to find (a) a patent that is infringed and (b) a patent that is well positioned 
for litigation across whatever criteria are relevant. 
3. Continuations 
The concept of shopping, where infringement is identified and a patent is 
acquired to fit, has a parallel in the patent prosecution process: continuations. 
During patent prosecution, an applicant can create a sister application, called a 
“continuation” or “continuation-in-part,” which contains the same narrative text as 
the original application198 but can have different claims.199 Continuations can be 
filed at any time during the application process, even after the examiner has allowed 
the application, as long as the applicant has not yet paid the issue fee.200 The range 
of things that can be claimed in a continuation application is limited, as the claims 
of the continuation must be supported by the narrative text of the  
original application.201 
Notwithstanding this limitation, in extreme cases, applicants can learn about 
an idea from a competitor and, if the idea is close to the subject matter in the original 
application but not covered by the claims of the original application, submit a 
continuation with new claims covering the competitor’s process.202 Thus, although 
a competitor may have been the first to discover a particular idea, the patent 
applicant can obtain a patent blocking the competitor from using the idea. The 
Federal Circuit has explained, “there is nothing improper, illegal or inequitable in 
filing a patent application for the purpose of obtaining a right to exclude a known 
competitor’s product from the market; nor is it in any manner improper to amend 
or insert claims intended to cover a competitor’s product.”203 
Despite the Federal Circuit’s reassuring words, allowance of continuations in 
this manner strikes scholars as troublesome.204 There have been several 
 
198. For a continuation. A continuation in part can contain different text in the specification. 
U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1895 (9th 
ed., 7th rev. Nov. 2015) [hereinafter MPEP]. 
199. The claims of a patent are legal formulas that define the boundaries of the patent.  
35 U.S.C. § 112 (claims “particularly point[ ] out and distinctly claim[ ] the subject matter which the 
inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention”). 
200. 35 U.S.C. § 120; 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(d). 
201. In re Lukach, 442 F.2d 967 (C.C.P.A. 1971); MPEP, supra note 198, § 2163(B) (“the written 
description requirement prevents an applicant from claiming subject matter that was not adequately 
described in the specification as filed. New or amended claims which introduce elements or limitations 
which are not supported by the as-filed disclosure violate the written description requirement.”). 
202. Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84  
B.U. L. REV. 63, 76 (2004). 
203. Kingsdown Med. Consultants v. Hollister, 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
204. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards, 48  
B.C. L. REV. 149, 163 (2007); Lemley & Moore, supra note 202, at 78. 
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unsuccessful attempts to limit the use of continuations, both in Congress205 and at 
the PTO.206 
Continuations are analogous to shopping because they allow a patent applicant 
to wait until infringement has occurred and then craft an ex post response to 
infringement, rather than requiring a patentee to predict ex ante what infringement 
will look like. The key criticism of use of continuations to cover a competitor’s 
product is that the “practice seems fundamentally unfair, since a competitor who 
was legitimately the first to invent a particular device or process may be held to have 
infringed on a patent claim written after . . . that invention.”207 
 
Table 1: Taxonomy of Patent Shoppers 
 
III. IMPLICATIONS & POLICY 
Patent shoppers and innovators behave in fundamentally dissimilar ways, with 
consequently divergent effects and implications. This Section analyzes these 
differences. 
 
205. H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005) (granting the USPTO the explicit ability to  
limit continuations). 
206. Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for Continued Examination 
Price, and Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, 71 Fed. Reg. 48 ( Jan. 3, 2006) (to be 
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
207. Lemley & Moore, supra note 202, at 78. 
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Table 2: Differences Between Shoppers and Innovators 
A. Enforcement Advantage 
In the game of patent enforcement, patent shoppers have a significant 
advantage over small innovators who own only one or two patents (and cannot 
acquire more). The small innovator has a limited number of choices for patent 
enforcement, meaning that in many instances a third party’s behavior will simply 
fall outside of their patents and the small innovator will not be able to use patent 
enforcement as a mechanism to prevent the behavior or monetize patent assets. In 
addition, even if the third party’s behavior falls within the patent, the patent may be 
of dubious validity, in which case it will be considerably riskier and more difficult 
for the plaintiff to win their case. 
The patent shopper’s advantage comes down to numbers. The patent shopper 
has access to a greater number of patents covering a wide variety of activities and, 
therefore, has a greater probability of having access to a valuable patent that can be 
successfully enforced. 
Because patent invalidity is so common208 and infringement is either difficult 
to prove or the patent simply does not end up covering important technology, most 
 
208. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
Grant Too Many Bad Patents?, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613, 615–17 (2015). 
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patents “turn out to have little or no commercial significance.”209 The value of any 
individual patent is “highly skewed, with the top 1 percent of patents more than a 
thousand times as valuable as the median patent.”210 This has led scholars to suggest 
that patents are like lottery tickets, where inventors seek patents “knowing that most 
of the resulting patents will turn out to be worthless, but hoping that a few will pay 
off big-time.”211 This uncertainty means that patent filing and enforcement 
behavior will reflect the “probabilistic” nature of patents.212 No patent is guaranteed 
to be valuable, enforceable, or valid. 
The probabilistic nature of patents impacts shoppers and innovators quite 
differently. Shoppers have access to a large pool of patents. If that pool is large 
enough and the patents are different enough that they will not all be infringed or 
invalidated by the same activities or evidence, then shoppers can overcome the 
probabilistic nature of patents. For example, if, on average, every patent has a 5% 
chance of being infringed by a target worth pursuing in litigation, a shopper has a 
strong chance of having a meritorious infringement case if she owns twenty or more 
patents. Similarly, if, on average, a patent has a 50% chance of being found to be 
invalid, a shopper with access to five patents has a good chance that at least one 
will be valid. These calculations assume independent probabilities (probably an 
unrealistic assumption) and become more complex when infringement, validity, and 
other factors are added to the same case. However, with patent portfolios frequently 
in the thousands and often in the tens of thousands, there are many companies who 
can feel confident that they own or have access to at least one valid and infringed 
patent. This is particularly advantageous if the shopper’s sole goal is monetization, 
rather than obtaining an injunction against a specific target. 
The innovator in the traditional model has, however, a much smaller 
probability of owning a patent that is valid and infringed. The innovator owns only 
one or two patents and thus, given the numbers in the hypothetical above, a much 
smaller chance of having an infringed or valid patent. Because the innovator only 
has access to a small number of patents, he cannot exploit sheer volume to 
overcome the probabilistic nature of patents. 
Every patent is unique, and access to many patents is no guarantee of winning, 
nor is access to only a small number of patents a guarantee that the patents are not 
valuable or enforceable. However, as a general matter, the patent shopper able to 
choose from a large pool of patents will have an enforcement advantage over the 
patentee restricted to only a small number of patents. 
 
209. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 30, at 75. Empirical evidence shows that only 0.1% of patents 
are litigated to trial. Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A 
Window on Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129, 130 (2001). 
210. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 30, at 80. For an empirical study, see John R. Allison, Mark 
A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore & R. Derek Trunkey, Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 460 (2004). 
211. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 30, at 81; see also, F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in 
EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss  
et al., eds., 2001). 
212. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 30, at 76. 
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B. Relationship to Infringement 
Innovators and patent shoppers have divergent views of patent infringement. 
Innovators who, under the traditional model, want to commercialize a product 
would prefer to avoid infringement if possible. Shoppers, by contrast, eagerly  
seek infringement. 
Innovators are often patenting in conjunction with development and 
commercialization of a product. They seek to create “a patent estate that maximizes 
value for the owner and discourages patent litigation.”213 The American Bar 
Association’s Patent Infringement Litigation Handbook explains that “[i]n a perfect 
world the grant of a patent would cause others to avoid working on anything close 
to the patented invention.”214 It further explains that the ideal patent would either 
cause “a competitor [to] withdraw[ ] from the market” or “sell[ ] only what is already 
in the prior art.”215 In other words, the goal is to dissuade competitors from 
approaching the patented area altogether. Infringement, though it can be addressed 
through litigation, simply creates headaches, and a “well-considered plan for 
invention protection” can be “used effectively to avoid expensive, time-consuming, 
and sometimes company killing patent infringement litigation.”216 
Patent shoppers view infringement very differently. Patent shoppers earn 
returns by identifying and addressing infringement, and thus both eagerly await it 
and actively seek it out. For example, Endeavor gives “significant  
consideration . . . to the identification of potential infringers” before acquiring a 
patent,217 Marathon seeks patents that “have large identifiable targets who have 
been using technology that we believe infringes our patents,”218 and Acacia 
identifies third-parties “that are practicing the invention(s) covered by the patent 
without obtaining permission from the patent owner to do so.”219 Shoppers derive 
no value from situations where a patent dissuades competitors from entering a 
market completely. Thus, infringement is transformed from an area of concern 
under the traditional model to a desired feature under the shopping model. 
This different relationship with infringement enhances the enforcement 
advantage already held by patent shoppers. If innovators enforce a patent, they do 
so to target a particular behavior or a particular competitor. This means that they 
have a small number of acceptable enforcement targets. Shoppers, by contrast, 
often enforce the patent with the goal of monetizing the patent. Thus, acceptable 
enforcement targets are diverse and numerous. This puts probability on the side of 
the shopper. The innovator may own two patents and have two possible 
 
213. ALAN R. THIELE, JUDITH R. BLAKEWAY & CHARLES M. HOSCH, THE PATENT 
INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION HANDBOOK: AVOIDANCE AND MANAGEMENT, at xviii (2010). 
214. Id. at 13. 
215. Id. at 14. 
216. Id. at xx. 
217. Endeavor Annual Report, supra note 137, at 3. 
218. Marathon Annual Report, supra note 120, at 1. 
219. Acacia 10-K, supra note 100, at 6. 
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infringement targets—a total of four different potential scenarios, of which the 
innovator must win one to accomplish its goal. The shopper may have access  
to one hundred patents and have one hundred different infringement  
targets—creating an enormous range of potential scenarios, winning any one of 
which would benefit the shopper. 
C. Strategic Implications 
For any case of deliberate infringement (or infringement caused by deliberate 
ignorance), the defendant first has the opportunity to select the plaintiff, and then 
the plaintiff has the opportunity to select the defendant. The defendant has the 
opportunity to select the plaintiff by deciding whether or not to take an infringing 
action. If he chooses to infringe, he chooses the possibility of being a defendant in 
an infringement suit. The plaintiff then has the opportunity to decide whether or 
not to bring an infringement suit. 
The dynamics of this choice are different under the traditional model of patent 
use and under the shopping model of patent use, though both choices still happen 
under both models. Under the traditional model, the dominant dynamic is the 
defendant choosing the plaintiff. Competitors could choose to enter a space with a 
patent and either try to license the patent, work-around the patent, or ignore the 
patent, the latter two potentially prompting a suit. Large companies anecdotally 
often ignored patents held by smaller players because they knew that small players 
did not have the resources to bring suit.220 The dynamic is one of an infringer 
choosing a calculated risk of infringement based on characteristics of the defendant, 
such as whether she is able to finance a lawsuit, the likelihood of a work-around 
actually infringing, reputational costs of a lawsuit, and others. The plaintiff must still 
choose to bring suit, but the defendant’s choice happens first. 
By contrast, under the shopping model, the dominant dynamic is one where 
the plaintiff chooses the defendant. A defendant still begins by infringing a patent, 
but the defendant is not choosing a plaintiff because the eventual plaintiff will not 
yet have bought the patent. At a later time, the plaintiff chooses the defendant by 
deciding whether or not to acquire a patent that is being infringed. The plaintiff can 
make that choice based on many different considerations such as whether there are 
many infringers, if it is a holdup situation, if the infringer has deep pockets, whether 
the suit against the infringer can be leveraged in some other way,221 and whether the 
infringer has a reputation for fighting back, giving in, or taking a license. For 
example, Marathon explains, “[T]he patent and patent rights that we seek to acquire 
have large identifiable targets who are or have been using the technology that we 
 
220. Lemley, supra note 66, at 21. 
221. For example, end user suits (though these are rare). Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, 
An Economic Analysis of Seller and User Liability in Intellectual Property Law, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 3 
(1999). Here the defendant is an individual who may be judgment proof, but the suit places great 
pressure on upstream manufacturers to obtain a license from the patentee. See, e.g., Dmitry Karshtedt, 
Damages for Indirect Patent Infringement, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 911, 970 (2014). 
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believe infringes . . . [our] patents.”222 In this manner, Marathon, who will be the 
plaintiff in any eventual enforcement action, is choosing the defendant by acquiring 
an infringed patent. 
D. Relationship to Patent Text 
The words of the patent have always been the dominant focus in both patent 
prosecution and patent litigation. Patent prosecutors are exhorted to put great effort 
into each word of the patent, particularly the patent claims, as “[e]very word and 
every phrase in a patent claim is a test.”223 In litigation, the text of the patent 
becomes even more crucial. In the famous words of Giles Rich, “[T]he name of the 
game is the claims.”224 
Under the traditional model of patent use, the patentee’s involvement in 
selecting the patent text is predominantly ex ante—the patentee’s drafting choices 
before patent grant set the bounds of the patent, and patent rights are then 
maintained statically throughout the life of the patent.225 More recent scholarship 
argues that while certain aspects of the patent are fixed ex ante, the scope of the 
patent is malleable within certain limits.226 Even under the malleability model, the 
portions of the patent that are fixed before patent grant are not insignificant. The 
patentee drafts the specification227 and claims of the patent during the application 
phase, and the prior art is fixed as of the priority date of the patent. Once the patent 
is granted, the claims of the patent in conjunction with the specification and prior 
art demarcate a defined space over which the patentee is granted the right to exclude 
others.228 After patent grant, the patentee can make modifying arguments during 
litigation by arguing the doctrine of equivalents or pursuing certain claim 
construction strategies. However, these opportunities are both limited by drafting 
choices and closely governed by the courts, which are (arguably) guided by a calculus 
of social benefit.229 
In contrast to the traditional model of patent use, the text of the patent as it 
was drafted ex ante is far less important to patent shoppers. Patent shoppers 
effectively choose the boundaries of their patent after grant by selecting a patent 
 
222. Marathon Annual Report, supra note 120, at 23. 
223. THIELE, supra note 213, at 10. 
224. Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims – American Perspectives, 21 
INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990). 
225. Jason Rantanen, The Malleability of Patent Rights, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 895, 895 (2015). 
226. Id. 
227. A narrative portion of the patent describing the invention. 37 C.F.R. § 1.51(b)(1). 
228. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim 
Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 65 (2005). 
229. Although exactly which calculus guides doctrine of equivalents decisions is debated and 
claim construction decisions may have no relation to social benefit at all. See Michael J. Meurer & Craig 
Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of 
Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1950 (2005) (“Recent decisions have moved away from a deontological 
fairness theory . . . . Unfortunately, the courts have not replaced their fairness theory with a new 
normative account that explains when and how the DOE contributes to social welfare.”). 
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having appropriate boundaries. The name of the game is still the claim, but the game 
is claim shopping, not claim drafting. 
E. Patent Enforcement Rates 
As discussed above, there is widespread underenforcement of patent 
infringement.230 Shoppers, by identifying instances of infringement and then 
acquiring and enforcing patents that might have otherwise gone unenforced, may 
reduce underenforcement.231 
In doing so, shoppers can be characterized as addressing an unfulfilled need 
in patent law. Many patentees cannot enforce their patents without help. If a 
patentee is an individual or small company, she may have approached larger 
companies about a license or to alert them to infringement but been ignored. Large 
companies are incentivized to ignore small patentees because the large company 
knows it will be difficult for the patentee to obtain financing to bring the case to 
court.232 The 2008 movie Flash of Genius tells the true story of Robert Kearns, who 
invented and patented the intermittent windshield wiper.233 He offered to sell his 
invention to several large car companies, but these companies ignored him.234 
Kearns was able to represent himself in court, although it took twelve years of 
litigation (during which, according to the movie, Kearns suffered a mental 
breakdown and his wife left him) in order for Kearns to obtain damages from the 
car companies.235 Unlike Kearns, most inventors cannot represent themselves in 
court and cannot pay for a lawyer.236  
Shoppers create opportunities for patent sale and actively seek instances where 
companies infringe on patents. Thus, previously ignored patentees can approach 
shoppers. For example, Endeavor explains that “[o]ften, individual inventors and 
small companies . . . are unable to effectively address the unauthorized use of their 
patented technologies” and that Endeavor seeks to partner with patentees that “do 
not have experience or expertise [and] . . . do not possess the in-house resources to 
devote to intellectual property licensing and enforcement activities.”237 This creates 
a needed mechanism to give enforcement power to small patentees. 
Increased enforcement in certain circumstances is helpful, but too much 
enforcement is a problem. Full patent enforcement would cause the economy to 
 
230. Supra Section I.C. 
231. For discussion of how “copyright trolls” enforce actions that would otherwise have gone 
underenforced, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86  
S. CAL. L. REV. 723, 725 (2013). 
232. See supra Section I.C on the challenges of obtaining financing for patent litigation. 
233. FLASH OF GENIUS (Universal Pictures 2008). 
234. The Associated Press, Robert Kearns, 77, Inventor of Intermittent Wipers, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 26, 2005, at A13. 
235. Kearns v. Chrysler Corp., 32 F.3d 1541, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
236. Supra Section I.C. 
237. Endeavor Annual Report, supra note 137, at 3. 
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grind to a halt.238 The rise in enforcement caused by patent shoppers has been 
criticized for hampering innovative companies who inadvertently infringe on 
patents.239 If a company infringed upon a patent of which they were unaware and 
could not realistically have been aware, is it fair to hold the company liable?240 
In tort law, economists have argued that liability is a vehicle for deterring 
undesirable conduct.241 Thus, underenforcement is an impediment to deterrence 
(though full enforcement would also not be optimal).242 However, tort law’s 
underenforcement-deterrence narrative does not sit comfortably in the world of 
patent law. The ultimate goal of patent law is incentivizing innovation.243 Some 
amount of enforcement of patent infringement likely does work towards this goal, 
but complete enforcement of patent infringement most likely would not. 
Innovation in patent law is an iterative process. It begins with an invention by a 
pioneering patentee, and the invention is then developed and expanded upon by 
downstream innovation. Maximal deterrence of patent infringement would 
incentivize innovation by the original, upstream, patentee because the value of the 
upstream patent would be higher if there was no unpunished infringement. 
However, maximal deterrence of patent infringement might hamper downstream 
innovation by increasing the price of that innovation. Where tort and patent law 
diverge is that infringement—the behavior that must be deterred to promote 
innovation—is often itself an innovation. 
There is no clear answer about the optimal level of infringement and 
enforcement thereof. It fits into a larger literature about the tradeoff between 
upstream and downstream innovation and is a question that has been explored at 
 
238. Because patent infringement is exceedingly common. See supra Section I.C. 
239. See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 40, at 18. 
240. Scholars have discussed this question at length outside of the context of shoppers, asking 
whether it is equitable to punish independent inventors. See, e.g., Michelle Armond, Introducing the 
Defense of Independent Invention to Motions for Preliminary Injunctions in Patent Infringement Lawsuits, 91 
CAL. L. REV. 117 (2003); Roger Milgrim, An Independent Invention Defense to Patent Infringement: The 
Academy Talking to Itself: Should Anyone Listen?, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 295 (2008); 
Samson Vermont, Independent Invention As a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475 
(2006). 
241. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972); STEVEN 
SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987). But see John C. P. Goldberg,  
Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 553 (2003) (explaining arguments against the 
deterrence theory of torts); Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort 
Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 381 (1994) (summarizing objections against deterrence-based 
theories of tort law). 
242. W. Jonathan Cardi, Randall D. Penfield & Albert H. Yoon, Does Tort Law Deter 
Individuals? A Behavioral Science Study, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 567, 570 (2012). 
Underenforcement is a problem across a variety of different types of torts. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, A 
Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 813 (1990); Kenneth S. Abraham & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Punitive 
Damages and the Rule of Law: The Role of Defendants’ Wealth, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 415, 419 (1989); 
David Shieh, Unintended Side Effects: Arbitration and the Deterrence of Medical Error, 89  
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1806, 1831 (2014); Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 
163 (2001). 
243. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 40, at 18. 
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length in the patent literature.244 An underlying empirical question is, if shoppers 
increase enforcement of patents, how much of that increase in enforcement 
incentivizes innovation? Not all shoppers innovate themselves; some are solely 
middlemen. In order for innovation to be incentivized, these shoppers must pass 
some returns on to the original inventor so that future inventors believe that they 
will be able to obtain higher returns on their patent and are consequently 
incentivized to innovate. Studies have attempted to put a number returns to 
innovators,245 but the results are controversial.246 Overall, while increased 
enforcement of patent infringement might result in increased innovation, it is far 
from clear that this is the case or that shoppers are the proper vehicle to accomplish 
increased enforcement. 
F. Marketability of Patents 
The purpose of patents is to incentivize innovation.247 This purpose would be 
poorly served if there were no way to buy or sell patents, or if the market in patents 
were very limited.248 Not every inventor who obtains a patent has the resources or 
desire to commercialize a product. Thus, patents must be saleable. 
Shoppers may help create a market for patents by buying patents from others. 
Shoppers also may create a market in patent claims. As described above, shoppers 
acquire patents for the purpose of litigation. Thus, a shopper purchasing a patent 
and then initiating a lawsuit is not different in any essential way from a contingency 
fee lawyer providing financing, for example, for a tort claim. Seen through the lens 
of market creation and litigation financing, shoppers enable the monetization of 
patents, presumably increasing the value of the patent right. More valuable patents 
should be a greater incentive for innovation.249 Under this narrative, shoppers may 
be promoting innovation. 
  
 
244. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998); Peter Lee, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, 
and Progress in Biomedical Science, 114 YALE L.J. 659, 661–62 (2004); Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative 
Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY  
TECH. L.J. 813, 819–20 (2001). 
245. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 95, at 411 (“Payments to independent inventors come to only 
5% of the direct costs to defendants (and are only 7% of NPE licensing revenues). Note furthermore 
that this figure likely overstates the longterm flow of funds to inventors . . . .”). 
246. David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the 
Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 434–41 (2014); see also David S. Olson, On NPEs, Holdups, 
and Underlying Faults in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 140 (2014). 
247. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
248. See, e.g., John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2115, 2117 
(2007) (explaining that denying injunctions based on the patent holder’s business model would “act as 
an undesirable drag on the efficiency and competitiveness of markets for innovation”). 
249. Merges & Nelson, supra note 33, at 868. 
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G. Policy 
Scholars and policymakers are actively trying to change policy in the patent 
arena. In 2011, the America Invents Act was passed, which President Obama called, 
“[T]he most significant reform of the Patent Act since 1952.”250 In the past five 
years, numerous further patent reform bills have been introduced before Congress, 
most targeted towards the types of entities who are likely to be patent shoppers.251 
The Obama White House issued statements advocating certain goals for patent 
policy.252 In sum, patent law is presently an area of active policy change, and the 
goal is often changing the behavior of shoppers. 
The normative effects of patent shoppers have been discussed at length by 
scholars in other contexts. As a result, this Article will not revisit the normative 
discussion at length but rather summarize the dominant conclusion: the acts of 
patent acquisition and enforcement are not inherently problematic themselves, but 
some actors are conducting these actions in problematic ways. The major behavioral 
concerns are discussed briefly in Part 1, below. 
The patent system has several mechanisms to protect against problematic 
behavior. However, these mechanisms have not worked particularly well to prevent 
abuses by PAEs. The shopping model can help explain the failure of presently 
available safeguards. In essence, the safeguards operate on the level of the individual 
patent and can, therefore, be “shopped around” by entities who have access to large 
numbers of patents. This is explored further in Part 2, below. 
Accepting the premise that some (though not all) patent shoppers behave in 
detrimental ways that are not well addressed by current policy, shopping theory 
provides some insight into how to craft policy that will impact shoppers. Part 3 
discusses the advantage and disadvantages of different approaches and proposes 
specific mechanisms to hamper shoppers’ bad behavior. 
  
 
250. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama Signs America 
Invents Act, Overhauling the Patent System to Stimulate Economic Growth, and Announces New 
Steps to Help Entrepreneurs Create Jobs (Sept. 16, 2011). 
251. Trade Protection Not Troll Protection Act, H.R. 2189, 115th Cong. (2017); Transparency 
in Assertion of Patents Act, S. 2049, 113th Cong. (2014); Patent Fee Integrity Act, S. 2146, 113th  
Cong. (2014); Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent Transparency and Improvements 
Act of 2013, S. 1720, 113th Cong. (2013); Demand Letter Transparency Act of 2013, H.R. 3540, 113th 
Cong. (2013); Patent Litigation Integrity Act of 2013, S. 1612, 113th Cong. (2013); Innovation Act, 
H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent Litigation and Innovation Act of 2013, H.R. 2639, 113th  
Cong. (2013); Stopping the Offensive Use of Patents Act, H.R. 2766, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent Abuse 
Reduction Act of 2013, S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2013); End Anonymous Patents Act, H.R. 2024, 113th 
Cong. (2013); Patent Quality Improvement Act of 2013, S. 866, 113th Cong. (2013); Saving High-Tech 
Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (2013). 
252. Press Release, White House Office of House Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet - Executive  
Actions: Answering the President’s Call to Strengthen Our Patent System and Foster Innovation  
(Feb. 20, 2014). 
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1. The Problem with Shoppers 
What is wrong with buying a patent? And if the patent is infringed, why is it 
wrong to seek a license from the infringer or sue if the infringer proves reluctant? 
Taken in isolation, these actions are important parts of a functioning patent system 
and are not wrong at all. Yet when a company buys a patent solely for the purpose 
of enforcement (rather than commercialization), it operates outside the traditional 
equilibrium of the system and therefore has a heightened chance of abusing the 
system.253 Companies that do research and commercialize products are thought to 
be restrained from, for example, filing nuisance patent suits or attempting to hold 
up a competitor for fear that they will have the same strategies used on them in 
return or that they will pay a reputational cost.254 Further, any monetary gain these 
companies might make from patent enforcement could be plowed back into their 
own innovative projects and therefore may be a net gain to innovation. Though not 
all shoppers are bad actors, and bad actions are not the sole province of shoppers, 
there are voluminous reports of shoppers using patent enforcement in the following 
problematic ways: 
Holdup: “The prospect of an injunction-induced blackout of handheld e-mail” 
has “haunted current policy discussions regarding U.S. patent law.”255 Injunctions 
were the traditional remedy for patent infringement.256 Thus, if a small and perhaps 
even unnecessary component of a complex device infringed on a patent, the 
patentee would have the power to enjoin all sales of that device until the infringer 
was able to negotiate a license or redesign the device to avoid infringement. Neither 
option would be particularly palatable to the infringer. The former would result in 
expense wildly disproportionate to the value of the infringer component because 
the patentee would have the infringer over a figurative barrel. The latter would 
require pulling the product from the market for the time needed to redesign, likely 
resulting in significant loss of customer base. The most well-known company to 
face this choice, Research in Motion, the maker of the BlackBerry handheld device, 
chose to negotiate a license and pay the patentee $612 million.257 
Injunctions are now harder to get, particularly for PAEs.258 However, the 
possibility still renders patent litigation a frightening prospect for defendants. 
Knowing this, patent shoppers can use patent enforcement to extract 
disproportionately large settlements. Further, “lock-in”—making a physical product 
 
253. Balganesh, supra note 231, at 747–69 (discussing the equilibrium in the context  
of copyright). 
254. Supra Section I.B. 
255. John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 506 (2010). 
256. Though this has changed somewhat in the aftermath of eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 
547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
257. Rob Kelley, BlackBerry Maker, NTP Ink $612 Million Settlement, CNNMONEY.COM 
(Mar. 3, 2006, 7:29 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2006/03/03/technology/rimm_ntp/ [https://
perma.cc/8DUH-ZX6Y] (“Research in Motion averts shutdown of wireless e-mail service . . . .”). 
258. Bernard H. Chao, After eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange: The Changing Landscape for Patent 
Remedies, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 543, 545 (2008). 
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that has a particular patented component—makes it difficult for potential 
defendants to easily change course to avoid suit. Patent shoppers may “wait[ ] until 
a technology is fully entrenched before scouting around for patents to acquire or 
asserting the patents it holds.”259 Because it is practically impossible for product 
companies to avoid all patent infringement, they cannot avoid exposing themselves 
to the possibility of holdup.260 
Nuisance suits: Patent litigation is expensive.261 This creates the potential for 
“nuisance fee economics,” described as a system where “defendants pay [settlement 
fees] not because of the economic value of the patent, but in order to avoid the cost 
of determining liability and resolving a patent demand.”262 PAEs will sometimes 
send demand letters or file suit with vague infringement allegations, where the 
defendant has strong arguments to counter but the defendant may find it easier and 
cheaper to pay a settlement rather than litigate.263 
Net loss of money for innovation: Proposals to restrict patent purchases and 
enforcement are not intuitively justifiable; why block a functioning market or 
impose costs on companies that have found an arbitrage opportunity and are simply 
exploiting it? Patents are not the same as other business opportunities. Most 
business opportunities do not rely on a monopoly grant from the government. The 
patent system does, and the monopoly grant is given for a specific purpose (set out 
in the Constitution): promoting innovation.264 A concern with shoppers is that they 
obtain large settlement or damage awards from infringers—who are often 
companies doing their own innovation—but very little of that money goes to the 
original patentee (presumably an innovator).265 Rather, the profit is in the hands of 
the middleman and is therefore taken out of the innovation cycle. Middlemen 
making a profit is not normally problematic, but when it is made as a product of a 
government-granted monopoly but does little to serve the goal of that grant, it is 
worrisome. 
To reiterate, nothing about the practice of patent shopping necessitates these 
behaviors, and not all patent shoppers behave in these ways. However, enough do 
that policymakers want to prevent these occurrences.266 The sections below first 
explain how patent shoppers evade some types of policy and then recommend 
several policies that will impact patent shoppers. 
 
259. Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law, 24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1591 (2009). 
260. Id. 
261. Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461, 467 (2014). 
262. Id. at 6. 
263. E.g., Ranganath Sudarshan, Nuisance-Value Patent Suits: An Economic Model and Proposal, 
25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 159 (2008). 
264. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
265. Bessen et al., supra note 54, at 28. 
266. See, e.g., legislative proposals cited supra note 252. 
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2. How Patent Shoppers Evade Policy 
All of these problems can occur in litigation brought by any type of patentee, 
not just patent shoppers. As a result, the patent system and the litigation system 
more broadly have safeguards built in to prevent certain bad outcomes. Several of 
these safeguards are described below. The descriptions are followed by explanations 
of how, while the safeguards may work for many patentees, shopping theory 
predicts that they will not work for patent shoppers because they can shop around 
the safeguards. 
Motions to Dismiss: Nuisance suits occur when there is weak support for the 
plaintiff’s case, but the defendant settles anyway because pursuing a judgment on 
the merits is expensive.267 When the facts are very weak or the complaint is 
exceedingly vague, these suits can be resolved through the relatively inexpensive 
measure of the motion to dismiss.268 While dismissal is not always effective against 
nuisance suits, it is particularly ineffective against nuisance suits brought by patent 
shoppers. First, patent shoppers have access to multiple patents and can bring 
multiple suits. A motion to dismiss might resolve each suit, but it is limited to the 
individual suit, and repetitive filing increases the cost to the defendant. Second, 
patent shoppers can deliberately acquire patents where the shopper can make at 
least a colorable argument that the patent relates to the defendant’s activities, 
making it difficult to win a motion to dismiss. Finally, patent shoppers can seek to 
acquire vague or ambiguous patents which might be more likely to survive a motion 
to dismiss because there may be at least some weak argument that the patent can be 
interpreted in the direction of the defendant’s activities. 
Doctrines Limiting Scope: The coverage of a patent is, as a theoretical matter, 
limited by what the inventor has actually invented, what the inventor has disclosed 
in the text of the patent, and what has previously been disclosed in the prior art. 
This limits the availability of patents quite significantly. Most companies will, 
therefore, only have patents related to what they invented and will only be able to 
litigate against defendants practicing those inventions. Not so for patent shoppers. 
Because patent shoppers can acquire patents on a wide variety of topics, patent 
shoppers can avoid limits build into individual patents by casting a net across a 
multitude of patents. 
Doctrines Invalidating Patents: Many granted patents are invalid.269 A study of 
invalidity rates found that courts held 46% of litigated patents to be invalid,270 and 
 
267. E.g., D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance 
Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 3 (1985). 
268. Id. at 12. 
269. See, e.g., Leslie, supra note 88, at 105–06. Some literature argues that invalid patents are 
actually not a problem because “the overwhelming majority of patents are never litigated or even 
licensed . . . it is much cheaper for society to make detailed validity determinations [only] in those few 
cases [where patents are litigated] than to invest additional resources examining patents that will never 
be heard from again.” Lemley, supra note 73, at 1497; Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 30, at 75. 
270. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 
26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998). 
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older studies suggest this number is even higher.271 If a patent is thought to be 
improperly granted and in fact invalid, it can be challenged in court.272 A powerful 
defense for a company worried about holdup, for example, is to argue that the 
plaintiff’s patent is invalid. Invalidity is less powerful against patent shoppers who 
can specifically search for patents that are likely to be valid, or who can assert 
multiple patents in the hopes that at least one is valid. For example, if the likelihood 
that any particular patent will be found to be invalid is 50%, a plaintiff with one 
patent to assert has a 50% chance of losing on the issue of validity. By contrast, a 
shopper who owns (for example) ten patents overlapping to cover a particular 
technology faces a much smaller chance that all ten patents are invalid.273 Although 
it is not always possible to predict whether or not a patent is valid before litigation, 
the shopper may be able to do some preliminary due diligence on the patents and 
bring only the most likely to be valid to litigation. Non-shoppers have no such 
recourse and only two choices: bring litigation using the one patent that they own, 
even if this patent is likely to be invalid, or avoid litigation entirely. 
Policy Changes Altering Substantive Law: If substantive patent law is changed in 
ways that weaken patents, as is sometimes suggested as a way to combat PAEs, it 
will have an attenuated effect on patent shoppers (the target of the law) and a far 
stronger effect on non-shoppers such as small innovators. Consider the following 
example relating to a hypothetical change in patent law that narrowed patents.274 
Narrowing patents will have less of an impact on shoppers than small innovators 
because, although narrowing patents will decrease the number of patents from 
which shoppers can select, they will still often be able to select good patents for 
litigation. By contrast, if the one patent owned by a small innovator is narrowed, in 
some instances the infringing behavior may fall entirely outside of the patent, and 
the shopper will not be able to enforce the patent at all. The diagram below 
illustrates this advantage. Circles represent patent scope, and the star represents the 
infringing behavior. In the top row, with patents of the initial breadth, both shopper 
and innovator have patents that cover the infringing behavior, though the shopper 
 
271. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Davis-Edwards Pharmacal Corp., 443 F.2d. 867, 872 (2d Cir. 1971) 
(“The bald fact is that more than 80% of patent infringement actions on appeal result in a determination 
that the patent sued upon is invalid.”). 
272. Although only if there is litigation or “a substantial controversy, between parties having 
adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory 
judgment.” MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007). 
273. This assumes that the probability of invalidity is independent for each patent, which will 
not necessarily be a correct assumption when the patents cover similar technologies. 
274. This is hypothetical, but frequently suggested. See, e.g., Alison E. Cantor, Using the Written 
Description and Enablement Requirements to Limit Biotechnology Patents, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 267, 
290 (2000); Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to 
Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615 (1998); Sean B. Seymore, Heightened 
Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV. 127, 154 (2008); Emanuel Vacchiano, It’s a 
Wonderful Genome: The Written-Description Requirement Protects the Human Genome from Overly-Broad 
Patents, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 805, 808 (1999). 
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has more patents that cover the behavior and the behavior sits squarely inside the 
patent’s scope, rather than towards its edge. In the second row, the breadth of all 
patents is narrowed. The patent shopper still has a patent covering the infringing 
behavior, though the behavior is now towards the edge of the patent’s scope. By 
contrast, the infringement now falls outside of the innovator’s patent. 
This is a hypothetical, and reality does not work so neatly. Policies to weaken 
patents, such as narrowing patents, will have some effect on patent shoppers. Weaker 
patents will result in increased prices and competition to acquire the remaining good 
patents, higher information costs to seek these patents out, and a reduced number 
of patents that are useful in enforcement actions. These issues all impact patent 
shoppers. 
 
Effect of Narrowing Patents on Patent Shopping Behavior 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Crafting Policy for Patent Shoppers 
Existing safeguards will be less effective against patent shoppers who can 
“shop around” the rule. Thus, to effectively alter the behavior of shoppers, policy 
must target either the shopping behavior itself or its predicates. An outright ban on 
shopping might be possible, perhaps by limiting alienability of claims or preventing 
the buyer of a patent from seeking a remedy for infringement that occurred or began 
prior to the patent owner’s acquisition. However, an outright ban is probably not 
desirable because not all shoppers are bad actors, and many may have positive 
effects. Moreover, limiting alienability of claims or ability to sell patents would be 
hugely problematic for inventors who want to license the patent to others with 
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expertise in commercializing the invention or small companies who cannot easily 
finance litigation and must obtain financing from another source. 
However, because patent shoppers do often behave in problematic ways and 
have certain advantages in litigation that may facilitate such behavior, a party’s ability 
to shop should be a red flag that triggers a variety of procedural measures to 
minimize the shopper’s ability to use their patent abusively. These measures are 
explored below. Each targets a particular problem common to patent shoppers 
(holdup, nuisance suits, or net loss of money for innovation) and proposes measures 
that will reduce the likelihood that a patent shopper will be able to cause  
those problems. 
a. Reducing the Ability of Shoppers to Holdup Innovators 
Patent shoppers have a particular ability to holdup innovators because they 
have an informational advantage. The shopper knows about an infringing behavior 
and specifically purchases the infringing behavior in order to create a holdup 
situation; meanwhile, the innovator is ignorant of these actions until the patent 
shopper chooses to ask for money. The most appropriate and effective policy 
response to this problem is to decrease the information asymmetry—for instance 
by requiring additional disclosure and creating a waiting period to allow the 
innovator to respond to the disclosure without immediate threat of suit. The waiting 
period gives the innovator an opportunity to redesign any infringing products so 
that, should the innovator in fact infringe, the innovator will face damages for past 
infringement but not the threat of future holdup. The waiting period additionally 
places any pre-litigation negotiation on a more even footing and allows potential 
defendants to challenge the patent’s validity in an inter partes review proceeding if 
applicable. The mechanism to obtain additional disclosure and a waiting period are 
described below. 
If a patent shopper with known aggressive enforcement tactics buys a patent, 
companies pay attention. Companies are in the practice of reviewing patents held 
by entities who may sue so that the companies may take various actions to avoid 
suit if possible and redesign products if not. However, companies are generally 
unable to figure out if a patent shopper has acquired a patent that may be relevant 
to them. This occurs for two reasons. First, patent shoppers are notoriously opaque 
about patent ownership, and there are no rules requiring disclosure of patent 
acquisition. Second, even if companies do find out about a relevant patent 
acquisition, there may not be time to respond if the patent shopper chooses to 
enforce immediately. Both of these issues can be resolved through policy changes. 
There have recently been several efforts to require disclosure of patent 
assignees and, in some versions, disclosure of patent acquisition. The USPTO 
proposed a rule titled “Changes to Require Identification of Attributable Owner”275 
 
275. Changes to Require Identification of Attributable Owner, 79 Fed. Reg. 4105 ( Jan. 24, 
2014) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
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which would have required disclosure of “titleholders,” “enforcement entities,” 
“ultimate parent entities,” and “hidden beneficial owners.”276 Attributable owners 
would have to be identified at several periods, including filing, issue, and payment 
of maintenance fees.277 The PTO ultimately withdrew the rule in the face of 
concerns that the changes required overly broad and expensive disclosure at 
numerous time periods, but as the disclosure was not linked to enforcement, the 
identity of parties enforcing a patent would still not be clear.278 Other policy efforts 
have been made to encourage disclosure including the Innovation Act, which 
required parties filing suit to disclose certain ownership details,279 and the somewhat 
similar End Anonymous Patents Act,280 Patent Abuse Reduction Act,281 Patent 
Transparency and Improvement Act,282 and Patent Litigation and Innovation 
Act.283 None of these Acts passed, but they, along with the PTO proposed rule, 
reflect a broad consensus that disclosure is important and needed, but the devil is 
in the details. 
This Article proposes a narrower form of disclosure tied specifically to 
enforcement. Specifically, attributable owners of patents should be disclosed at least 
one year prior to litigation, with exceptions for changes of ownership occurring 
within a year284 of enforcement made the normal course of business that are not 
related to acquisition of the patent (for example, if a company owning a patent 
merged with another company). The advantage of tying disclosure to enforcement 
is that it reduces the cost of disclosure because it will not be necessary for the vast 
majority of patents that are not enforced. It also focuses disclosure on time periods 
where it will be most useful. 
Additionally, it creates a built-in waiting period between acquisition and 
enforcement. If a patent shopper purchases a patent, even if it discloses ownership 
immediately, it will have to wait a year before enforcing the patent. This gives 
potential defendants the opportunity to search for sales of patents that might be 
relevant to their products or processes and provides these companies the 
opportunity to obtain the information at least a year before any enforcement action 
can be brought. Companies, therefore, have a period of time to find and implement 
work-arounds if possible, negotiate without the threat of immediate holdup, or to 
ask the PTO to review the validity of the patent in an inter partes review action. 
 
276. Id. at 4110. 
277. Id. at 4106. 
278. Nathan P. Anderson, Striking a Balance: The Pursuit of Transparent Patent Ownership, 30 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 395, 420 (2015); see also Robin Feldman, Transparency, 19 VA. J.L. & TECH. 271, 
276 (2014). 
279. Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 4 (2013). 
280. End Anonymous Patents Act, H.R. 2024, 113th Cong. § 2(e)(5) (2013). 
281. Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 2013, S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2013). 
282. Patent Transparency and Improvements Act, S. 1720, 113th Cong. § 3(b)(1) (2013). 
283. Patent Litigation and Innovation Act of 2013, H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. (2013). 
284. The ideal waiting period is an empirical question. 
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This policy would disadvantage patent shoppers, in that it would take away the 
potential threat of holdup and any advantage of secrecy. However, even if the 
infringer is able to redesign products to avoid infringement going forward, the 
patent shopper will be able to obtain damages for past infringement. Therefore, the 
patent is still valuable. It is most equitable to give patent shoppers damages for past 
infringement but not allow them to extract rent for holdup if that holdup is 
avoidable through designing-around. Patentees should get the benefit of their 
invention and of the scope they have obtained in the patent but not the benefit of 
informational asymmetry that capitalizes on an infringer’s sunk investment; that is 
outside of the reward intended to be provided by the patent system. 
A variant on the disclosure policy would be to require public auctions of all 
patents. This system might ask patent owners to list their patents on a public 
exchange if they were willing to sell and would disclose the name of the eventual 
buyer and the price at which the patent is bought. Though this is significant 
deviation from the current world of patent sales, public disclosure of patent sale 
prices have been discussed in other contexts as a way to increase to “rationalize 
patent transactions” and it would make clear to “the world at large what the normal 
price is for patent rights,” as patent prices are currently very arbitrary.285 Public 
patent sales are also thought to increase the efficiency and transparency of the 
patent market.286 
In the context of patent shoppers, public patent sales would essentially make 
everyone a patent shopper. It would significantly reduce the ability of traditional 
patent shoppers to capitalize on information asymmetries because there would be 
little remaining informational advantage available. It would additionally give 
companies that might be defendants in infringement suits the ability to buy the 
patent directly from the inventor instead of the less efficient system of having a 
patent shopper threatening suit as a middleman. Finally, it would allow small 
innovators to signal that they are serious about enforcement. Small innovators 
might not have sufficient financing to litigate an infringement action, and thus, their 
patents are sometimes ignored by infringers, causing the small innovator to turn to 
a patent shopper for help enforcing the patent. If small innovators could signal they 
were preparing to sell the patent to a shopper by placing the patent on the public 
exchange, infringing companies might be willing to settle directly with the small 
innovator without the need for the patent shopper middleman. 
b. Preventing Nuisance Suits 
Nuisance suits or demand letters—the practice of asking for settlement or 
payment for infringement that is not actually happening or of a patent that is almost 
certainly not actually valid—has little redeeming value. Patent shoppers may be 
 
285. Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market, 36 HOFSTRA  
L. REV. 257, 258 (2007). 
286. Michael Risch, Patent Portfolios As Securities, 63 DUKE L.J. 89, 93 (2013). 
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more prone to nuisance actions because they can acquire patents that are particularly 
suited to these actions because, for example, they are vague or they facially cover 
technology used by a wide range of entities (even if the patent is invalid). Further, 
patent shoppers can acquire many patents so they can file suit after suit, requiring 
continuous defense. 
The measures proposed above increased disclosure and a waiting period, will 
help reduce nuisance suits. They will prevent situations such as one where a patent 
shopper created dozens of subsidiary companies and used the subsidiaries to send 
out demand letters. “Some of the small businesses received letter from more than 
one subsidiary across time . . . this type of approach can result in multiple payments 
to what is essentially the same entity.”287 
Further policy measures can also help, particularly those tailored to preventing 
nuisance suits caused by patent shoppers’ access to large numbers of patents. 
Specifically, this Article proposes a system to manage multiple suits with different 
patents by the same attributable owners. If one attributable owner filed many suits 
against the same target, the filing burden should be heightened. These changes 
would kick in at a particular suit threshold, for example, the fifth suit by the same 
attributable entity against the same defendant within some period of time. After this 
threshold, there could be heightened filing requirements for the complaint, for 
example, requiring the plaintiff to file full infringement contentions at the same time 
as the complaint.288 This would accomplish two things. First, it would increase the 
expense of filing suit, a possible deterrent. Second, it would give the defendant more 
information earlier in the suit, helping the defendant make an informed decision 
about whether or not to settle. Lack of information early in a suit is a key component 
of nuisance-filer’s strategy. As described by Robin Feldman: 
[A] patent holder can file suit alleging infringement of a particular patent 
without specifying much more. This can impose a series of costs on the 
target company, which must try to analyze all of the claims in the patent, 
and all of its own products and activities, to look for any plausible reason 
for the allegation. Moreover, the cost to challenge a single patent in court 
can range from $600,000 to $6 million . . . . As a result, a patent holder can 
launch an attack on a target for a minimal expenditure, offering to settle 
below what it would cost the target to challenge the demand, or in some 
cases below what it would cost to fully analyze the demand.289 
Heightened pleading requirements would not entirely eliminate this problem, 
but by providing additional information on the particular claims allegedly infringed 
and the product allegedly infringing, it would reduce the cost for the defendant to 
analyze the complaint. Additionally, if the patent shopper has already filed multiple 
 
287. Feldman, supra note 279, at 293. 
288. In 2015, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to heighten pleading 
standards in patent cases, however, the precise contours of this standard are still being determined by 
the courts. See, e.g., Disc Disease Solutions, Inc., v. VGH Sols., Inc., 888 F.3d 1256, 1258–59 (2018). 
289. Feldman, supra note 279, at 287–88. 
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suits, the potential that the current suit is a nuisance suit or otherwise abusive is 
higher. Therefore, it is more acceptable to place additional burdens on the patentee. 
c. Improve Return to Innovators 
If patent shoppers buy a patent for a small amount of money and then sue an 
innovative company and obtain a significant damage award, the shopper takes 
money from an innovator with no commensurate returns to another innovator. 
There is, therefore, a net loss of money to the innovation system. This section 
proposes policy measures to improve returns to the initial innovator (patentee) so 
that more money stays in the innovation system and less is siphoned out to the 
middleman. 
As discussed above, disclosure will help. As the practice of patent acquisition 
has become more prominent, an increasing number of inventors are familiar with 
the strategy. Therefore, if a patent holder is approached by a well-known patent 
shopper, she is more likely to ask for a higher price since she may assume the 
shopper is seeking the patent in anticipation of litigation. Thus, it would be helpful 
to require patent shoppers to disclose their attributable owners to the patent seller 
prior to purchase. 
Further, policy could require that patent acquirers (seeking to purchase patents 
in anticipation of litigation) disclose any potential litigation targets to patent sellers 
in order to avoid information asymmetry in subsequent bargaining and to potentially 
obtain a more equitable reward for the seller. However, reducing the bargaining 
power of shoppers in this manner might prove to be an excessive discouragement 
to patent acquisition, hampering the market for buying and selling patents, which 
might, in turn, reduce incentives for innovation. 
Another method to improve returns to innovators in a world of patent 
shoppers is to treat patent acquisition like contingent fee litigation. Tort law has 
grappled with the problem of personal injury lawyers seeking cases and then taking 
a problematically high percentage of any damage award.290 Resultantly, many states 
have responded by placing caps on the percent of any damages that may go to the 
lawyer.291 Translated to the patent context, this sort of policy might dictate that 
some set percentage of enforcement revenue goes to the original inventor and that 
the inventor has some control over the enforcement strategy. This would ensure 
that an equitable amount of revenue returns to the original inventor and might also, 
by allowing the inventor some say in enforcement decisions, mitigate some of the 
most egregious types of enforcement.292 
 
290. This has been discussed extensively in the context of contingency fee tort litigation. Some 
of this discussion is summarized in Lester Brickman, Contingency Fee Abuses, Ethical Mandates, and the 
Disciplinary System: The Case Against Case-by-Case Enforcement, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1339, 1340 
(1996). 
291. Albert Yoon, Damage Caps and Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study of Malpractice 
Litigation in the South, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 199, 200 (2001). 
292. Balganesh, supra note 231, at 725. 
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However, this strategy also has disadvantages. Inventors might prefer the 
outright sale of a patent to avoid risk and obtain money up front. It would be 
challenging to determine the optimal fee cap, as reasonable minds will no doubt 
differ on the notion of what is equitable. Further, the optimal fee cap might be 
different in different industries and under different conditions, posing additional 
challenges to its implementation. In addition, fee caps on enforcement of acquired 
patents would have odd effects on corporate mergers and acquisitions. When 
Company A acquires Company B, it is common for A to acquire B’s patents as well. 
If A later enforced a patent from B, would A have to give proceeds back to the 
original inventors, likely employees of B (and perhaps now employees of A)? 
Finally, if incentives, disclosure, and caps are not sufficient to improve returns 
to innovators, a direct approach would be to tax damage awards if the plaintiff is a 
company that does not innovate. The money derived from the tax could then be 
reinvested in various measures to promote innovation, such as grants to small 
companies or NIH funding. The logistics, of course, would be difficult. For 
example, it would be difficult to differentiate between damage awards to plaintiffs 
who do not innovate and damage awards to companies that do innovate but that 
funnel profit, such as damage awards to shareholders instead of R&D. Further, 
taxes are rarely a politically palatable option. However, with proper design, a tax 
scheme would effectively return money to innovators. 
CONCLUSION 
Patent law and policy are heavily influenced by archetypes of the players in the 
system. The literature has built up rhetoric and mythos around characters, such as 
the inventor,293 the audience,294 and the infringer.295 The narrative of the traditional 
 
293. Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 709 (2012) 
(explaining that the “theory of patent law is based on the idea that a lone genius can solve problems 
that stump the experts” but ultimately rejecting this narrative.); see also Cotropia, supra note 29, at  
54–55 (“We enjoy stories of independent inventors, working against all odds to provide society with 
amazing technological breakthroughs . . . . The patent system has traditionally taken the individual 
inventor motif to heart and seen patents as a vehicle to both fuel individual inventors and protect them 
from large corporations.”). 
294. Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement, 
112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1264 (2014) (“the PHOSITA—the expert—is still the audience through 
whose eyes the intrinsic evidence is examined. But just who is the PHOSITA?”); Mark D. Janis  
& Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN. L. REV. 72, 74 (2012) (“[I]t was not unusual 
for popular newspapers or magazines to report at length on patent decisions, ostensibly for an idealized 
readership of ingenious Yankee mechanics or yeoman farmers . . . . The fact is that patent law is 
probably much more remote from its putative end users than patent law rhetoric  
conventionally admits.”). 
295. For example, the narrative of the patent infringer, particularly whether the infringement 
was innocent, and whether the resultant product or service was socially beneficial, has been discussed 
at length, as these distinctions are important components of the moral case for various patent defenses 
and remedies. See, e.g., Peter Lee, The Accession Insight and Patent Infringement Remedies, 110  
MICH. L. REV. 175, 202–07 (2011); William F. Lee & Lawrence P. Cogswell, III, Understanding and 
Addressing the Unfair Dilemma Created by the Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 41  
HOUS. L. REV. 393, 395–96 (2004); Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the 
Second to Printer_Freilich (Do Not Delete) 3/4/2020  5:30 PM 
670 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:619 
ex ante model of patent use is perhaps among the most powerful preconceptions 
that guide patent law.296 And yet, the traditional model is not an accurate description 
of how many plaintiffs use the patent system. Rather, as described herein, the 
shopping ex post model better fits the behavior of key classes of plaintiffs, such as 
patent assertion entities and large companies. 
As compared to the traditional model, the shopping model shifts the story of 
patent use. The traditional model begins with acquisition of a patent, followed by 
infringement, and requires the patent drafter to predict where and how infringement 
will occur. By contrast, the shopping model begins with infringement, followed by 
acquisition of a patent to fit the infringement, and allows the plaintiff to choose a 
patent that responds to infringement. In the traditional model, patents are used in a 
forward-looking manner. In the shopping model, patents are wielded looking 
backwards. The traditional model is passive; the patent holder must wait for 
infringement. The shopping model is active; the patent holder may seek out 
infringement. The traditional model holds tightly to the link between invention, 
infringement, and enforcement, while the shopping model disaggregates these 
actions. 
In this manner, understanding shopping improves our comprehension of the 
patent system as a whole. It paints a new picture of patent enforcement, which may 
help explain several previously puzzling empirical observations. For example, prior 
work has found that patent litigation involving multiple patents increases the chance 
that the patentee will prevail with respect to each individual patent.297 Patent litigation 
involving multiple patents may be more likely to have been brought by shoppers 
(who have access to multiple patents). Therefore, they may have been able to curate 
the asserted patents to increase the likelihood that each individual patent will win. 
By adding the shopping narrative to the current array of stories about 
inventors, audience, and infringers, I hope to more accurately describe how patents 
are used today, help craft better policy, and reorient the extensive literature about 
the normative effects of patent assertion entities and patent portfolios. 
* * * 
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